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Improvements in information processing technology, and in com-
munications are likely to transform many aspects of economic life, but
likely no sector of the economy will be more profoundly affected than
the financial sector. Financial markets are rapidly becoming better
connected with one another, the costs of trading in them are falling,
and market participants now have access to more information more
quickly about developments in the markets and in the economy more
broadly. As a result, opportunities for arbitrage are exploited and elim-
inated more rapidly. The financial system can be expected to become
more efficient, in the sense that the dispersion of valuations of claims
to future payments across different individuals and institutions is min-
imized. For familiar reasons, this should be generally beneficial for the
allocation of resources in the economy.
Some, however, fear that the job of central banks will be complicat-
ed by improvements in the efficiency of financial markets, or even that
the ability of central banks to influence the markets may be eliminat-
ed altogether. This suggests a possible conflict between the aim of
increasing microeconomic efficiency—the efficiency with which
resources are correctly allocated among competing uses at a point in
time—and that of preserving macroeconomic stability, through prudent
central-bank regulation of the overall volume of nominal expenditure.
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Here, I consider two possible grounds for such concern. I first con-
sider the consequences of increased information on the part of market
participants about monetary policy actions and decisions. According
to the view that the effectiveness of monetary policy is enhanced by,
or even entirely dependent upon, the ability of central banks to sur-
prise the markets, there might be reason to fear that monetary policy
will be less effective in the information economy. I then consider the
consequences of financial innovations tending to reduce private-sector
demand for the monetary base. These include the development of
techniques that allow financial institutions to more efficiently manage
their customers’ balances in accounts subject to reserve requirements
and their own balances in clearing accounts at the central bank, so that
a given volume of payments in the economy can be executed with a
smaller quantity of central-bank balances. And somewhat more spec-
ulatively, some argue that “electronic money” of various sorts may
soon provide alternative means of payment that can substitute for
those currently supplied by central banks. It may be feared that such
developments can soon eliminate what small leverage central banks
currently have over the private economy, so that again monetary poli-
cy will become ineffective.
I shall argue that there is little ground for concern on either count.
The effectiveness of monetary policy is, in fact, dependent neither
upon the ability of central banks to fool the markets about what they
do, nor upon the manipulation of significant market distortions, and
central banks should continue to have an important role as guarantors
of price stability in a world where markets are nearly frictionless and
the public is well-informed. Indeed, I shall argue that monetary policy
can be even more effective in the information economy, by allowing
central banks to use signals of future policy intentions as an addition-
al instrument of policy, and by tightening the linkages between the
interest rates most directly affected by central-bank actions and other
market rates.
However, improvements in the efficiency of the financial system
may have important consequences, both for the specific operating pro-
cedures that can most effectively achieve banks’ short-run targets, and
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for the type of decision procedures for determining the operating tar-
gets that will best serve their stabilization objectives. In both respects,
the U.S. Federal Reserve might well consider adopting some of the
recent innovations pioneered by other central banks. These include the
use of standing facilities as a principal device through which overnight
interest rates are controlled, as is currently the case in countries like
Canada and New Zealand; and the apparatus of explicit inflation tar-
gets, forecast-targeting decision procedures, and published Inflation
Reports as means of communicating with the public about the nature
of central-bank policy commitments, as currently practiced in coun-
tries like the U.K., Sweden, and New Zealand.
Improved information about central bank actions 1
One possible ground for concern about the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy in the information economy derives from the belief that the
effectiveness of policy actions is enhanced by, or even entirely
dependent upon, the ability of central banks to surprise the markets.
Views of this kind underlay the preference, commonplace among cen-
tral bankers until quite recently, for a considerable degree of secrecy
about their operating targets and actions, to say nothing of their rea-
soning processes and their intentions regarding future policy. Improved
efficiency of communication among market participants, and greater
ability to process large quantities of information should make it increas-
ingly unlikely that central bank actions can remain secret for long.
Wider and more rapid dissemination of analyses of economic data, of
statements by central-bank officials, and of observable patterns in pol-
icy actions are likely to improve markets’ ability to forecast central
banks’ behavior as well, whether banks like this or not. In practice,
these improvements in information dissemination have coincided
with increased political demands for accountability from public
institutions of all sorts in many of the more advanced economies,
and this had led to widespread demands for greater openness in cen-
tral-bank decision-making.
As a result of these developments, the ability of central banks to sur-
prise the markets, other than by acting in a purely erratic manner (that
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obviously cannot serve their stabilization goals), is likely to be
reduced. Should we expect this to reduce the ability of central banks
to achieve their stabilization goals? Should central banks seek to delay
these developments to the extent that they are able?
I shall argue that such concerns are misplaced. There is little ground
to believe that secrecy is a crucial element in effective monetary poli-
cy. To the contrary, more effective signaling of policy actions and pol-
icy targets, and above all, improvement of the ability of the private
sector to anticipate future central bank actions should increase the
effectiveness of monetary policy, and for reasons that are likely to
become even more important in the information economy.
The effectiveness of anticipated policy 1.1
One common argument for the greater effectiveness of policy
actions that are not anticipated in advance asserts that central banks can
have a larger effect on market prices through trades of modest size if
these trades are not signaled in advance. This is the usual justification
given for the fact that official interventions in foreign-exchange mar-
kets are almost invariably secret, not being confirmed even after the
interventions have taken place. But a similar argument might be made
for maximizing the impact of central banks’ open-market operations
upon domestic interest rates, especially by those who feel that the
small size of central-bank balance sheets relative to the volume of trade
in money markets makes it implausible that central banks should be
able to have much effect upon market prices. The idea, essentially, is
that unanticipated trading by the central bank should move market
rates by more, owing to the imperfect liquidity of the markets. Instead,
if traders are widely able to anticipate the central bank’s trades in
advance, a larger number of counter-parties should be available to trade
with the bank, so that a smaller change in the market price will be
required in order for the market to absorb a given change in the supply
of a particular instrument.
But such an analysis assumes that the central bank better achieves its
objectives by being able to move market yield more, even if it does so
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by exploiting temporary illiquidity of the markets. But the temporari-
ly greater movement in market prices that is so obtained occurs only
because these prices are temporarily less well coupled to decisions
being made outside the financial markets. Hence, it is not at all obvi-
ous that any actual increase in the effect of the central bank’s action
upon the economy—upon the things that are actually relevant to the
bank’s stabilization goals—can be purchased in this way.
The simple model presented in the Appendix may help to illustrate
this point. In this model, the economy consists of a group of house-
holds that choose a quantity to consume and then allocate their
remaining wealth between money and bonds. When the central bank
conducts an open-market operation, exchanging money for bonds, it is
assumed that only a fraction γ of the households are able to participate
in the bond market (and so to adjust their bond holdings relative to
what they had previously chosen). I assume that the rate of partici-
pation in the end-of-period bond market could be increased by the
central bank by signaling in advance its intention to conduct an open-
market operation, that will, in general, make it optimal for a household
to adjust its bond portfolio. The question posed is whether “catching
the markets off guard” in order to keep the participation rate γ small
can enhance the effectiveness of the open-market operation.
It is shown that the equilibrium bond yield i is determined by an
equilibrium condition of the form.1
where ∆Μ is the per capita increase in the money supply through
open-market bond purchases, and the function d(i) indicates the
desired increase in bond holding by each household that participates
in the end-of-period trading, as a function of the bond yield deter-
mined in that trading. The smaller is γ, the larger the portfolio shift that
each participating household must be induced to accept, and so the
larger the change in the equilibrium bond yield i for a given size of
open-market operation ∆Μ. This validates the idea that surprise can
increase the central bank’s ability to move the markets.
d i M( ) = ( )∆ / ,γ
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But this increase in the magnitude of the interest-rate effect goes
hand in hand with a reduction in the fraction of households whose
expenditure decisions are affected by the interest-rate change. The
consumption demands of the fraction 1– γ of households not partici-
pating in the end-of-period bond market are independent of i, even if
they are assumed to make their consumption-saving decision only
after the open-market operation. (They may observe the effect of the
central bank’s action upon bond yields, but this does not matter to
them, because a change in their consumption plans cannot change
their bond holdings.) If one computes aggregate consumption expen-
diture C, aggregating the consumption demands of the γ households
who participate in the bond trading and the 1–γ who do not, then the
partial derivative δC/δ∆M is a positive quantity that is independent of
γ. Thus, up to a linear approximation, reducing participation in the
end-of-period bond trading does not increase the effects of open-mar-
ket purchases by the central bank upon aggregate demand, even
though it increases the size of the effect on market interest rates.
It is sometimes argued that the ability of a central bank (or other
authority, such as the Treasury) to move a market price through its
interventions is important for reasons unrelated to the direct effect of
that price movement on the economy; it is said, for example, that such
interventions are important mainly in order to a “send a signal” to the
markets, and presumably the signal is clear only insofar as a non-triv-
ial price movement can be caused.2 But while it is certainly true that
effective signaling of government policy intentions is of great value, it
would be odd to lament improvements in the timeliness of private-sec-
tor information about government policy actions on that ground.
Better private-sector information about central-bank actions and delib-
erations should make it easier, not harder, for central banks to signal
their intentions, as long as they are clear about what those intentions are.
Another possible argument for the desirability of surprising the
markets derives from the well-known explanation for central-bank
“ambiguity” proposed by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)3 These
authors assume, as in the “New Classical” literature of the 1970s, that
deviations of output from potential are proportional to the unexpected
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component of the current money supply. They also assume that policy-
makers wish to increase output relative to potential, and to an extent
that varies over time as a result of real disturbances. Rational expecta-
tions preclude the possibility of an equilibrium in which money
growth is higher than expected (and, hence, in which output is higher
than potential) on average. However, it is possible for the private sec-
tor to be surprised in this way at some times, as long as it also happens
sufficiently often that money growth is less than expected. This bit of
leverage can be used to achieve stabilization aims if it can be arranged
for the positive surprises to occur at times when there is an unusually
strong desire for output greater than potential (for example, because
the degree of inefficiency of the “natural rate” is especially great), and
the negative surprises at times when this is less crucial. This is possi-
ble, in principle, if the central bank has information about the distur-
bances that increase the desirability of high output that is not shared
with the private sector. This argument provides a reason why it may be
desirable for the central bank to conceal information that it has about
current economic conditions that are relevant to its policy choices. It
even provides a reason why a central bank may prefer to conceal the
actions that it has taken (for example, what its operating target has
been), insofar as there is serial correlation in the disturbances about
which the central bank has information not available to the public, so
that revealing the bank’s past assessment of these disturbances would
give away some of its current informational advantage as well.
However, the validity of this argument for secrecy about central-
bank actions and central-bank assessments of current conditions
depends upon the simultaneous validity of several strong assumptions.
In particular, it depends upon a theory of aggregate supply according
to which surprise variations in monetary policy have an effect that is
undercut if policy can be anticipated.4 While this hypothesis is famil-
iar from the literature of the 1970s, it has not held up well under fur-
ther scrutiny. Despite the favorable early result of Barro (1977), the
empirical support for the hypothesis that “only unanticipated money
matters” was challenged in the early 1980s (notably, by Barro and
Hercowitz, 1980, and Boschen and Grossman, 1982), and the hypoth-
esis has largely been dismissed since then.
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Nor is it true that this particular model of the real effects of nominal
disturbances is uniquely consistent with the hypotheses of rational
expectations or optimizing behavior by wage- and price-setters. For
example, a popular simple hypothesis in recent work has been a model
of optimal price-setting with random intervals between price changes,
originally proposed by Calvo (1983).5 This model leads to an aggre-
gate-supply relation of the form
(1.1)
where πt is the rate of inflation between dates t–1 and t, yt is the log of
real GDP, is the log of the “natural rate” of output (equilibrium out-
put with flexible wages and prices, here a function of purely exogenous
real factors), Etπt+1 is the expectation of future inflation conditional
upon period-t public information, and the coefficients κ>0,0<β<1 are
constants. As with the familiar “New Classical” specification implicit
in the analysis of Cukierman and Meltzer, which we may write using
similar notation as
(1.2)
this is a short-run “Phillips curve” relation between inflation and out-
put that is shifted both by exogenous variations in the natural rate of
output and by endogenous variations in expected inflation.
However, the fact that current expectations of future inflation mat-
ter for (1.1), rather than past expectations of current inflation as in
(1.2), makes a crucial difference for present purposes. Equation (1.2)
implies that in any rational-expectations equilibrium,
so that output variations due to monetary policy (as opposed to real
disturbances reflected in y ) must be purely unforecastable a period in
advance. Equation (1.1) has no such implication. Instead, this relation
implies that both inflation and the output at any date t depend solely
upon (i) current and expected future nominal GDP, relative to the
t
n
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n
−
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304 Michael Woodford
period t –1 price level, and (ii) the current and expected future natural
rate of output, both conditional upon public information at date t. The
way in which output and inflation depend upon these quantities is
completely independent of the extent to which any of the information
available at date t may have been anticipated at earlier dates. Thus,
signaling in advance the way that monetary policy seeks to affect the
path of nominal expenditure does not eliminate the effects upon real
activity of such policy—it does not weaken them at all!
Of course, the empirical adequacy of the simple “New Keynesian
Phillips Curve” (1.1) has also been subject to a fair amount of criti-
cism. However, it is not as grossly at variance with empirical evidence
as is the “New Classical” specification.6 Furthermore, most of the
empirical criticism focuses upon the absence of any role for lagged
wage and/or price inflation as a determinant of current inflation in this
specification. But if one modifies the aggregate-supply relation (1.1)
to allow for inflation inertia—along the lines of the well-known spec-
ification of Fuhrer and Moore (1995), the “hybrid model” proposed by
Gali and Gertler (1999), or the inflation-indexation model proposed by
Christiano et al. (2001)—the essential argument is unchanged. In these
specifications, it is current inflation relative to recent past inflation that
determines current output relative to potential; but inflation acceleration
should have the same effects whether anticipated in the past or not.
Some may feel that a greater impact of unanticipated monetary pol-
icy is indicated by comparisons between the reactions of markets (for
example, stock and bond markets) to changes in interest-rate operat-
ing targets that are viewed as having surprised many market partici-
pants and reactions to those that were widely predicted in advance. For
example, the early study of Cook and Hahn (1989) found greater
effects upon Treasury yields of U.S. Federal Reserve changes in the
federal funds rate operating target during the 1970s at times when
these represented a change in direction relative to the most recent
move, rather than continuation of a series of target changes in the same
direction; these might plausibly have been regarded as the more unex-
pected actions. More recent studies such as Bomfim (2000) and
Kuttner (2001) have documented larger effects upon financial markets
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of unanticipated target changes using data from the fed funds futures
market to infer market expectations of future Federal Reserve interest-
rate decisions.
But these quite plausible findings in no way indicate that the Fed’s
interest-rate decisions affect financial markets only insofar as they are
unanticipated. Such results only indicate that when a change in the
Fed’s operating target is widely anticipated in advance, market prices
will already reflect this information before the day of the actual deci-
sion. The actual change in the Fed’s target, and the associated change
at around the same time in the federal funds rate itself, makes rela-
tively little difference insofar as Treasury yields and stock prices
depend upon market expectations of the average level of overnight
rates over a horizon extending substantially into the future, rather than
upon the current overnight rate alone. Information that implies a future
change in the level of the funds rate should affect these market prices
immediately, even if the change is not expected to occur for weeks;
while these prices should be little affected by the fact that a change has
already occurred, as opposed to being expected to occur (with com-
plete confidence) in the following week. Thus, rather than indicating
that the Fed’s interest-rate decisions matter only when they are not
anticipated, these findings provide evidence that anticipations of
future policy matter—and that market expectations are more sophisti-
cated than a mere extrapolation of the current federal funds rate.
Furthermore, even if one were to grant the empirical relevance of the
“New Classical” aggregate-supply relation, the Cukierman-Meltzer
defense of central-bank ambiguity also depends upon the existence of
a substantial information advantage on the part of the central bank
about the times at which high output relative to potential is particular-
ly valuable. This might seem obvious, insofar as it might seem that the
state in question relates to the aims of the government, about which
the government bureaucracy should always have greater insight. But
if we seek to design institutions that improve the general welfare, we
should have no interest in increasing the ability of government insti-
tutions to pursue idiosyncratic objectives that do not reflect the inter-
ests of the public. Thus, the only relevant grounds for variation in the
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desired level of output relative to potential should be ones that relate
to the economic efficiency of the natural rate of output (which may,
indeed, vary over time, due, for example, to time variation in market
power in goods and/or labor markets). Yet, government entities have
no inherent advantage at assessing such states. In the past, it may have
been the case that central banks could produce better estimates of such
states than most private institutions, thanks to their large staffs of
trained economists and privileged access to government statistical
offices. However, in coming decades, it seems likely that the dissem-
ination of accurate and timely information about economic conditions
to market participants should increase. If the central bank’s informa-
tional advantage with regard to the current severity of market distor-
tions is eroded, there will be no justification (even according to the
Cukierman-Meltzer model) for seeking to preserve an informational
advantage with regard to the bank’s intentions and actions.
Thus, there seems little ground to fear that erosion of central banks’
informational advantage over market participants, to the extent that
one exists, should weaken banks’ ability to achieve their legitimate
stabilization objectives. Indeed, there is considerable reason to believe
that monetary policy should be even more effective under circum-
stances of improved private-sector information. This is because suc-
cessful monetary policy is not so much a matter of effective control of
overnight interest rates, or even of effective control of changes in the
CPI, so much as of affecting in a desired way the evolution of market
expectations regarding these variables. If the beliefs of market partici-
pants are diffuse and poorly informed, this is difficult, and monetary pol-
icy will necessarily be a fairly blunt instrument of stabilization policy; but
in the information economy, there should be considerable scope for
the effective use of the traditional instruments of monetary policy.
It should be rather clear that the current level of overnight interest
rates as such is of negligible importance for economic decision-mak-
ing; if a change in the overnight rate were thought to imply only a
change in the cost of overnight borrowing for that one night, then even
a large change (say, a full percentage point increase) would make lit-
tle difference to anyone’s spending decisions. The effectiveness of
Monetary Policy in the Information Economy 307
changes in central-bank targets for overnight rates in affecting spend-
ing decisions (and, hence, ultimately pricing and employment deci-
sions) is wholly dependent upon the impact of such actions upon other
financial-market prices, such as longer-term interest rates, equity
prices, and exchange rates. These are plausibly linked, through arbi-
trage relations, to the short-term interest rates most directly affected
by central-bank actions; but it is the expected future path of short-term
rates over coming months and even years that should matter for the
determination of these other asset prices, rather than the current level
of short-term rates by itself.
The reason for this is probably fairly obvious in the case of longer-
term interest rates; the expectations theory of the term structure
implies that these should be determined by expected future short rates.
It might seem, however, that familiar interest-rate parity relations
should imply a connection between exchange rates and short-term
interest rates. It should be noted, however, that interest-rate parity
implies a connection between the interest-rate differential and the rate
of depreciation of the exchange rate, not its absolute level, whereas it
is the level that should matter for spending and pricing decisions. Let
us write this relation in the form
(1.3)
where et is the real exchange rate, it and i the domestic and foreign
short-term nominal interest rates, πt and π the domestic and foreign
inflation rates, and ψt a “risk premium” here treated as exogenous. If
the real exchange rate fluctuates over the long run around a constant
level , it follows that we can “solve forward” (1.3) to obtain
(1.4)
where is the long-run average value of the term r ≡ i – Etπt+1 –ψt.
Note that in this solution, a change in current expectations regarding
the short-term interest rate at any future date should move the exchange
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Of course, what this means is that the most effective way of moving the
exchange rate, without violent movements in short-term interest rates,
will be to change expectations regarding the level of interest rates over
a substantial period of time.
Similarly, it is correct to argue that intertemporal optimization ought
to imply a connection between even quite short-term interest rates and
the timing of expenditure decisions of all sorts. However, the Euler
equations associated with such optimization problems relate short-
term interest rates not to the level of expenditure at that point in time,
but rather to the expected rate of change of expenditure. For example,
(a log-linear approximation to) the consumption Euler equation
implied by a standard representative-household model is of the form
(1.5)
where ct is the log of real consumption expenditure, ρt represents
exogenous variation in the rate of time preference, and σ > 0 is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Many standard business-cycle
models furthermore imply that long-run expectations
where g is the constant long-run growth rate of consumption, should
be independent of monetary policy (being determined solely by popu-
lation growth and technical progress, here treated as exogenous). If so,
we can again “solve forward” (1.5) to obtain
(1.6)
Once more, we find that current expenditure should depend mainly
upon the expected future path of short rates, rather than upon the cur-
rent level of these rates.7 Woodford (2001, chap. 4) similarly shows
that optimizing investment demand (in a neoclassical model with con-
vex adjustment costs, but allowing for sticky product prices) is a func-
tion of a distributed lead of expected future short rates, with nearly
constant weights on expected short rates at all horizons.
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Thus, the ability of central banks to influence expenditure, and
hence pricing, decisions is critically dependent upon their ability to
influence market expectations regarding the future path of overnight
interest rates, and not merely their current level. Better information
on the part of market participants about central-bank actions and
intentions should increase the degree to which central-bank policy
decisions can actually affect these expectations, and so increase the
effectiveness of monetary stabilization policy. Insofar as the signifi-
cance of current developments for future policy are clear to the private
sector, markets can, to a large extent, “do the central bank’s work for
it,” in that the actual changes in overnight rates required to achieve the
desired changes in incentives can be much more modest when expect-
ed future rates move as well.
There is evidence that this is already happening, as a result both of
greater sophistication on the part of financial markets and greater
transparency on the part of central banks, the two developing in a sort
of symbiosis with one another. Blinder et al. (2001, p. 8) argue that in
the period from early 1996 through the middle of 1999, one could
observe the U.S. bond market moving in response to macroeconomic
developments that helped to stabilize the economy, despite relatively
little change in the level of the federal funds rate, and suggest that this
reflected an improvement in the bond market’s ability to forecast Fed
actions before they occur. Statistical evidence of increased forecasta-
bility of Fed policy by the markets is provided by Lange et al. (2001),
who show that the ability of Treasury bill yields to predict changes in
the federal funds rate some months in advance has increased since the
late 1980s.
The behavior of the funds rate itself provides evidence of a greater
ability of market participants to anticipate the Fed’s future behavior. It
is frequently observed now that announcements of changes in the
Fed’s operating target for the funds rate (made through public state-
ments immediately following the Federal Open Market Committee
meeting that decides upon the change, under the procedures followed
since February 1994) have an immediate effect upon the funds rate,
even though the Trading Desk at the New York Fed does not conduct
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open market operations to alter the supply of Fed balances until the
next day at the soonest (Meulendyke, 1998; Taylor, 2001). This is
sometimes called an “announcement effect.” Taylor (2001) interprets
this as a consequence of intertemporal substitution (at least within a
reserve maintenance period) in the demand for reserves, given the
forecastability of a change in the funds rate once the Fed does have a
chance to adjust the supply of Fed balances in a way consistent with
the new target. Under this interpretation, it is critical that the Fed’s
announced policy targets are taken by the markets to represent credi-
ble signals of its future behavior; given that they are, the desired effect
upon interest rates can largely occur even before any actual trades by
the Fed.
Demiralp and Jorda (2001b) provide evidence of this effect by
regressing the deviation between the actual and target federal funds
rate on the previous two days’ deviations, and upon the day’s change
in the target (if any occurs). The regression coefficient on the target
change is substantially less than one (indicating adjustment of the
funds rate in the desired direction on the day of the target change), and
is smaller since 1994 (on the order of .4) than in the period 1984-1994
(nearly .6). This suggests that the ability of the markets to understand
the consequences of FOMC decisions for movements in the funds rate
has improved since the Fed’s introduction of explicit announcements
of its target rate, though it was non-negligible even before this. Of
course, this sort of evidence indicates forecastability of Fed actions
only over very short horizons (a day or two in advance), and fore-
castability over such a short time does not in itself help much to influ-
ence spending and pricing decisions. Still, the “announcement effect”
provides a simple illustration of the principle that anticipation of pol-
icy actions in advance is more likely to strengthen the intended effects
of policy, rather than undercutting them as the previous view would
have it. In the information economy, it should be easier for the
announcements that central banks choose to make regarding their pol-
icy intentions to be quickly disseminated among and digested by mar-
ket participants. And to the extent that this is true, it should provide
central banks with a powerful tool through which to better achieve
their stabilization goals.
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Consequences for the conduct of policy 1.2
We have argued that improved private-sector information about pol-
icy actions and intentions will not eliminate the ability of central
banks to influence spending and pricing decisions. However, this does
not mean that there are no consequences for the effective conduct of
monetary policy of increased market sophistication about such mat-
ters. There are several lessons to be drawn, which are relevant to the
situations of the leading central banks even now, but which should be
of only greater importance as information processing improves.
One is that transparency is valuable for the effective conduct of
monetary policy. It follows from our above analysis that being able to
count upon the private sector’s correct understanding of the central
bank’s current decisions and future intentions increases the precision
with which a central bank can, in principle, act to stabilize both prices
and economic activity. We have argued that in the information econo-
my, improved private-sector information is inevitable; but central
banks can obviously facilitate this as well, though striving better to
explain their decisions to the public. The more sophisticated markets
become, the more scope there will be for communication about even
subtle aspects of the bank’s decisions and reasoning, and it will be
desirable for central banks to take advantage of this opportunity.
In fact, this view has become increasingly widespread among cen-
tral bankers over the past decade.8 In the U.S., the Fed’s degree of
openness about its funds-rate operating targets has notably increased
under Alan Greenspan’s tenure as chairman.9 In some other countries,
especially inflation-targeting countries, the increase in transparency
has been even more dramatic. Central banks such as the Bank of
England, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Swedish
Riksbank are publicly committed not only to explicit medium-run
policy targets, but even to fairly specific decision procedures for
assessing the consistency of current policy with those targets, and to
the regular publication of Inflation Reports that explain the bank’s
decisions in this light.
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The issue of what exactly central banks should communicate to the
public is too large a question to be addressed in detail here; Blinder et
al. (2001) provide an excellent discussion of many of the issues. I will
note, however, that from the perspective suggested here, what is impor-
tant is not so much that the central bank’s deliberations themselves be
public, as that the bank give clear signals about what the public should
expect it to do in the future. The public needs to have as clear as pos-
sible an understanding of the rule that the central bank follows in decid-
ing what it does. Inevitably, the best way to communicate about this
will be by offering the public an explanation of the decisions that have
already been made; the bank itself would probably not be able to
describe how it might act in all conceivable circumstances, most of
which will never arise. But it is important to remember that the goal
of transparency should be to make the central bank’s behavior more
systematic, and to make its systematic character more evident to the
public—not the exposure of “secrets of the temple” as a goal in itself.
For example, discussions of transparency in central banking often
stress such matters as the publication of minutes of deliberations by
the policy committee, in as prompt and as unedited a form as possible.
Yet, it is not clear that provision of the public with full details of the
differences of opinion that may be expressed before the committee’s
eventual decision is reached really favors public understanding of the
systematic character of policy. Instead, this can easily distract atten-
tion to apparent conflicts within the committee, and to uncertainty in
the reasoning of individual committee members, which may reinforce
skepticism about whether there is any “policy rule” to be discerned.
Furthermore, the incentive provided to individual committee members
to speak for themselves rather than for the institution may make it
harder for the members to subordinate their individual votes to any
systematic commitments of the institution, thus making policy less
rule-based in fact, and not merely in perception.
More to the point would be an increase in the kind of communica-
tion provided by the Inflation Reports. These reports do not pretend to
give a blow-by-blow account of the deliberations by which the central
bank reached the position that it has determined to announce; but they
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do explain the analysis that justifies the position that has been reached.
This analysis provides information about the bank’s systematic
approach to policy by illustrating its application to the concrete cir-
cumstances that have arisen since the last report; and it provides infor-
mation about how conditions are likely to develop in the future
through explicit discussion of the bank’s own projections. Because the
analysis is made public, it can be expected to shape future delibera-
tions; the bank knows that it should be expected to explain why views
expressed in the past are not later being followed. Thus, a commitment
to transparency of this sort helps to make policy more fully rule-based,
as well as increasing the public’s understanding of the rule.
Another lesson is that central banks must lead the markets. Our
statement above that it is not desirable for banks to surprise the mar-
kets might easily be misinterpreted to mean that central banks ought
to try to do exactly what the markets expect, insofar as that can be
determined. Indeed, the temptation to “follow the markets” becomes
all the harder to avoid in a world where information about market
expectations is easily available to central bankers as well as to the
market participants themselves. But this would be a mistake, as
Blinder (1998, chap. 3, sec. 3) emphasizes. If the central bank deliv-
ers whatever the markets expect, then there is no objective anchor for
these expectations: Arbitrary changes in expectations may be self-
fulfilling because the central bank validates them.10 This would be de-
stabilizing, for both nominal and real variables. To avoid this, central
banks must take a stand as to the desired path of interest rates, and
communicate it to the markets (as well as acting accordingly). While
the judgments upon which such decisions are based will be fallible,
failing to give a signal at all would be worse. A central bank should
seek to minimize the extent to which the markets are surprised, but it
should do this by conforming to a systematic rule of behavior and
explaining it clearly, not by asking what others expect it to do.
This points up the fact that policy should be rule-based. If the bank
does not follow a systematic rule, then no amount of effort at trans-
parency will allow the public to understand and anticipate its policy.
The question of the specific character of a desirable policy rule is also
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much too large a topic for the current occasion. However, a few
remarks may be appropriate about what is meant by rule-based policy.
I do not mean that a bank should commit itself to an explicit state-
contingent plan for the entire foreseeable future, specifying what it
would do under every circumstance that might possibly arise. That
would obviously be impractical, even under complete unanimity about
the correct model of the economy and the objectives of policy, simply
because of the vast number of possible futures. But it is not necessary
in order to obtain the benefits of commitment to a systematic policy.
It suffices that a central bank commit itself to a systematic way of
determining an appropriate response to future developments, without
having to list all of the implications of the rule for possible future
developments.11
Nor is it necessary to imagine that commitment to a systematic rule
means that once a rule is adopted it must be followed forever, regard-
less of subsequent improvements in understanding of the effects of
monetary policy on the economy, including experience with the con-
sequences of implementing the rule. If the private sector is forward-
looking, and it is possible for the central bank to make the private
sector aware of its policy commitments, then there are important
advantages of commitment to a policy other than discretionary opti-
mization—i.e., simply doing what seems best at each point in time,
with no commitment regarding what may be done later. This is
because there are advantages to having the private sector be able to
anticipate delayed responses to a disturbance, that may not be optimal
ex post if one re-optimizes taking the private sector’s past reaction as
given. But one can create the desired anticipations of subsequent
behavior—and justify them—without committing to follow a fixed
rule in the future no matter what may happen in the meantime.
It suffices that the private sector has no ground to forecast that the
bank’s behavior will be systematically different from the rule that it
pretends to follow. This will be the case if the bank is committed to
choosing a rule of conduct that is justifiable on certain principles,
given its model of the economy.12 The bank can then properly be
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expected to continue to follow its current rule, as long as its under-
standing of the economy does not change; and as long as there is no
predictable direction in which its future model of the economy should
be different from its current one, private-sector expectations should
not be different from those in the case of an indefinite commitment to
the current rule. Yet, changing to a better rule will remain possible in
the case of improved knowledge (which is inevitable); and insofar as
the change is justified both in terms of established principles and in
terms of a change in the bank’s model of the economy that can itself
be defended, this need not impair the credibility of the bank’s pro-
fessed commitments.
It follows that rule-based policymaking will necessarily mean a
decision process in which an explicit model of the economy (albeit
one augmented by judgmental elements) plays a central role, both in
the deliberations of the policy committee and in explanation of those
deliberations to the public. This too has been a prominent feature of
recent innovations in the conduct of monetary by the inflation-target-
ing central banks, such as the Bank of England, the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand, and the Swedish Riksbank. While there is undoubtedly
much room for improvement both in current models and current
approaches to the use of models in policy deliberations, one can only
expect the importance of models to policy deliberations to increase in
the information economy.
Erosion of demand for the monetary base 2
Another frequently expressed concern about the effectiveness of
monetary policy in the information economy has to do with the poten-
tial for erosion of private-sector demand for monetary liabilities of the
central bank. The alarm has been raised, in particular, in a widely
discussed recent essay by Benjamin Friedman (1999). Friedman
begins by proposing that it is something of a puzzle that central banks
are able to control the pace of spending in large economies by con-
trolling the supply of “base money” when this monetary base is itself
so small in value relative to the size of those economies. The scale of
the transactions in securities markets through which central banks
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such as the U.S. Federal Reserve adjust the supply of base money is
even more minuscule when compared to the overall volume of trade
in those markets.13
He then argues that this disparity of scale has grown more extreme
in the past quarter century as a result of institutional changes that have
eroded the role of base money in transactions, and that advances in
information technology are likely to carry those trends still farther in
the next few decades.14 In the absence of aggressive regulatory inter-
vention to head off such developments, the central bank of the future
will be “an army with only a signal corps”—able to indicate to the pri-
vate sector how it believes that monetary conditions should develop,
but not able to do anything about it if the private sector has opinions
of its own. Mervyn King (1999) similarly proposes that central banks
are likely to have much less influence in the twenty-first century than
the did in the previous one, as the development of “electronic money”
eliminates their monopoly position as suppliers of means of payment.
The information technology revolution clearly has the potential to
fundamentally transform the means of payment in the coming century.
But does this really threaten to eliminate the role of central banks as
guarantors of price stability? Should new payments systems be regu-
lated with a view to protecting central banks’ monopoly position for as
long as possible, sacrificing possible improvements in the efficiency
of the financial system in the interest of macroeconomic stability?
I shall argue that these concerns as well are misplaced. Even if the
more radical hopes of the enthusiasts of “electronic money” are real-
ized, there is little reason to fear that central banks should not still
retain the ability to control the level of overnight interest rates, and by
so doing to regulate spending and pricing decisions in the economy in
essentially the same way as at present. It is possible that the precise
means used to implement a central bank’s operating target for the
overnight rate will need to change in order to remain effective in a
future “cashless” economy, but the way in which these operating tar-
gets themselves are chosen in order to stabilize inflation and output
may remain quite similar to current practice.
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Will money disappear, and does it matter? 2.1
There are a variety of reasons why improvements in information
technology might be expected to reduce the demand for base money.
Probably the most discussed of these—and the one of greatest poten-
tial significance for traditional measures of the monetary base—is the
prospect that “smart cards” of various sorts might replace currency
(notes and coins) as a means of payment in small, everyday transac-
tions. In this case, the demand for currency issued by central banks
might disappear. While experiments thus far have not made clear the
degree of public acceptance of such a technology, many in the tech-
nology sector express confidence that “smart cards” should largely
displace the use of currency within only a few years.15 Others are
more skeptical. Goodhart (2000), for example, argues that the popu-
larity of currency will never wane—at least in the black-market
transactions that arguably account for a large fraction of aggregate
currency demand—owing to its distinctive advantages in allowing for
unrecorded transactions. And improvements in information technolo-
gy can conceivably make currency more attractive. For example, in
the United States the spread of ATM machines has increased the size
of the cash inventories that banks choose to hold, increasing currency
demand relative to GDP.16
More to the point, in our view, is the observation that even a com-
plete displacement of currency by “electronic cash” of one kind or
another would in no way interfere with central-bank control of
overnight interest rates. It is true that such a development could, in
principle, result in a drastic reduction in the size of countries’ mone-
tary bases, since currency is, by far, the largest component of conven-
tional measures of base money in most countries.17 But neither the
size nor even the stability of the overall demand for base money is of
relevance to the implementation of monetary policy, unless central
banks adopt monetary-base targeting as a policy rule—a proposal
found in the academic literature,18 but seldom attempted in practice.
What matters for the effectiveness of monetary policy is central-
bank control of overnight interest rates,19 and these are determined in
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the interbank market for the overnight central-bank balances that
banks (or sometimes other financial institutions) hold in order to satisfy
reserve requirements and to clear payments. The demand for currency
affects this market only to the extent that banks obtain additional cur-
rency from the central bank in exchange for central-bank balances, as
a result of which fluctuations in currency demand affect the supply of
central-bank balances, to the extent that they are not accommodated
by offsetting open-market operations by the central bank. In practice,
central-bank operating procedures almost always involve an attempt
to insulate the market for central-bank balances from these distur-
bances by automatically accommodating fluctuations in currency
demand,20 and this is one of the primary reasons that banks conduct
open-market operations (though such operations are unrelated to any
change in policy targets). Reduced use of currency, or even its total
elimination, would only simplify the central bank’s problem by elimi-
nating this important source of disturbances to the supply of central-
bank balances under current arrangements.
However, improvements in information technology may also reduce
the demand for central-bank balances. In standard textbook accounts,
this demand is due to banks’ need to hold reserves in a certain propor-
tion to transactions balances, owing to regulatory reserve require-
ments. However, faster information processing can allow banks to
economize on required reserves, by shifting customers’ balances more
rapidly between reservable and non-reservable categories of
accounts.21 Indeed, since the introduction of “sweep accounts” in the
United States in 1994, required reserves have fallen substantially.22 At
the same time, increased bank holdings of vault cash, as discussed
previously, have reduced the need for Fed balances as a way of satis-
fying banks’ reserve requirements. Due to these two developments, the
demand for Fed balances to satisfy reserve requirements has become
quite small—only a bit more than six billion dollars at present (see
Table 1). As a consequence, some have argued that reserve require-
ments are already virtually irrelevant in the United States as a source
of Fed control over the economy. Furthermore, the increased availabil-
ity of opportunities for substitution away from deposits subject to
reserve requirements predictably leads to further pressure for the
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reduction or even elimination of such regulations; as a result, recent
years  have seen a worldwide trend toward lower reserve require-
ments.23
But such developments need not pose any threat to central-bank con-
trol of overnight interest rates. A number of countries, such as the
U.K., Sweden, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, among others,
have completed eliminated reserve requirements. Yet, these countries’
central banks continue to implement monetary policy through operat-
ing targets for an overnight interest rate, and continue to have consid-
erable success at achieving their operating targets. Indeed, as we show
below, some of these central banks achieve tighter control of overnight
interest rates than does the U.S. Federal Reserve.
The elimination of required reserves in these countries does not
mean the disappearance of a market for overnight central-bank bal-
ances. Instead, central-bank balances are still used to clear inter-bank
payments. Indeed, even in the United States, balances held to satisfy
reserve requirements account for less than half of total Fed balances
(as shown in Table 1),24 and Furfine (2000) argues that variations in
the demand for clearing balances account for the most notable high-
frequency patterns the level and volatility of the funds rate in the
United States. In the countries without reserve requirements, this
demand for clearing purposes has simply become the sole source of
demand for central-bank balances. Given the existence of a demand
for clearing balances (and, indeed, a somewhat interest-elastic
demand, as discussed in the next section), a central bank can still con-
trol the overnight rate through its control of the net supply of central-
bank balances.
Nonetheless, the disappearance of a demand for required reserves
may have consequences for the way that a central bank can most effec-
tively control overnight interest rates. In an economy with an efficient
interbank market, the aggregate demand for clearing balances will be
quite small relative to the total volume of payments in the economy;
for example, in the United States, banks that actively participate in the
payments system typically send and receive payments each day about
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thirty times the size of their average overnight clearing balances, and
the ratio is as high as 200 for the most active banks (Furfine, 2000).
Exactly for this reason, random variation in daily payments flows can
easily lead to fluctuations in the net supply of and demand for
overnight balances that are large relative to the average level of such
balances.25 This instability is illustrated by Chart 2, showing the daily
variation in aggregate overnight balances at the Reserve Bank of
Australia, over several periods during which the target overnight rate
does not change, and over which the actual overnight rate is also rela-
tively stable (as shown in Chart 1).
A consequence of this volatility is that quantity targeting—say,
adoption of a target for aggregate overnight clearing balances, while
allowing overnight interest rates to attain whatever level should clear
the market, as under the nonborrowed reserves targeting procedure
followed in the United States in the period 1979-1982—will not be a
reliable approach to stabilization of the aggregate volume of spending,
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Required reserves
Applied vault cash 32.3
Fed balances to satisfy reserve requirements 6.5
Total required reserves 38.8
Fed balances
Required clearing balances 7.1
Adjustment to compensate for float .4
Fed balances to satisfy reserve requirements 6.5
Excess reserves 1.1
Total Fed balances 15.1
1 Reserves held to satisfy legal reserve requirements, and total balances of depository institu-
tions held with U.S. Federal Reserve Banks. Averages for the two-week period ending August
8, 2001, in billions of dollars.
Sources: Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.3, August 9, 2001, and Statistical Release
H.4.1, August 2, 2001, and August 9, 2001.
Table 1
Reserves and Balances1
if practicable at all. And even in the case of an operating target for the
overnight interest rate, the target is not likely to be most reliably
attained through daily open-market operations to adjust the aggregate
supply of central-bank balances, the method currently used by the Fed.
The overnight rate at which the interbank market clears is likely to be
highly volatile, if the central bank conducts an open-market operation
only once, early in the day, and there are no standing facilities of the
kind that limit variation of the overnight rate under the “channel” sys-
tems discussed below. In the United States at present, errors in judg-
ing the size of the open-market operation required on a given day can
be corrected only the next day without this resulting in daily fluctua-
tions in the funds rate that are too great, owing to the intertemporal
substitution in the demand for Fed balances stressed by Taylor (2001).
But the scope for intertemporal substitution results largely from the
fact that U.S. reserve requirements apply only to average reserves over
a two-week period; and, indeed, funds rate volatility is observed to be
higher on the last day of a reserve maintenance period (Spindt and
Hoffmeister, 1988; Hamilton, 1996; Furfine, 2000). There is no simi-
lar reason for intertemporal substitution in the demand for clearing
balances, as penalties for overnight overdrafts are imposed on a daily
basis.26 Hence, the volatility of the overnight interest rate, at least at
the daily frequency, could easily be higher under such an operating
procedure, in the complete absence of (or irrelevance of) reserve
requirements.27
Many central banks in countries that no longer have reserve require-
ments, nonetheless, achieve tight control of overnight interest rates,
through the use of a “channel” system of the kind described in the next
section. In a system of this kind, the overnight interest rate is kept near
the central bank’s target rate through the provision of standing facili-
ties by the central bank, with interest rates determined by the target
rate. Such a system is likely to be more effective in an economy with-
out reserve requirements, and one may well see a migration of other
countries, such as the United States, toward such a system as existing
trends further erode the role of legal reserve requirements.
Improvements in information technology may well reduce the
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demand for central-bank balances for clearing purposes as well. As the
model presented below shows, the demand for non-zero overnight
clearing balances results from uncertainty about banks’ end-of-day
positions in their clearing accounts that has not yet been resolved at
the time of trading in the interbank market. But such uncertainty is
entirely a function of imperfect communication; were banks to have
better information sooner about their payment flows, and were the
interbank market more efficient at allowing trading after the informa-
tion about these flows has been fully revealed, aggregate demand for
overnight clearing balances would be smaller and less interest-elastic.
In principle, sufficiently accurate monitoring of payments flows
should allow each bank to operate with zero overnight central-bank
balances.
Yet, once again, I would argue that future improvements in the effi-
ciency of the financial system pose no real threat to central-bank con-
trol of overnight rates. The model presented implies that the effects
upon the demand for clearing balances of reduced uncertainty about
banks’ end-of-day positions can be offset by reducing the opportunity
cost of overnight balances as well, by increasing the rate of interest
paid by the central bank on such balances. In order for the interbank
market to remain active, it is necessary that the interest paid on
overnight balances at the central bank not be made as high as the tar-
get for the market overnight rate. But as the interbank market becomes
ever more frictionless (the hypothesis under consideration), the size of
the spread required for this purpose becomes smaller. There should
always be a range of spreads that are small enough to make the
demand for clearing balances interest-elastic, while, nonetheless, large
enough to imply that banks with excess balances will prefer to lend
these in the interbank market, unless the overnight rate in the inter-
bank market is near the deposit rate, and, thus, well below the target
rate. (This latter behavior is exactly what is involved in an interest-
elastic demand for overnight balances.) Thus, once again, some mod-
ification of current operating procedures may be required, but without
any fundamental change in the way that central banks can affect
overnight rates.
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Finally, some, such as Mervyn King (2000), foresee a future in
which electronic means of payment come to substitute for current sys-
tems in which payments are cleared through central banks.28 This
prospect is highly speculative at present; most current proposals for
variants of “electronic money” still depend upon the final settlement
of transactions through the central bank, even if payments are made
using electronic signals rather than old-fashioned instruments such as
paper checks. And Charles Freedman (2000), for one, argues that the
special role of central banks in providing for final settlement is unlike-
ly ever to be replaced, owing to the unimpeachable solvency of these
institutions, as government entities that can create money at will. Yet,
the idea is conceivable, at least in principle, since the question of final-
ity of settlement is ultimately a question of the quality of one’s infor-
mation about the accounts of the parties with whom one transacts—
and while the development of central banking has undoubtedly been a
useful way of economizing on limited information-processing capaci-
ties, it is not clear that advances in information technology could not
make other methods viable.
One way in which the development of alternative, electronic pay-
ments systems might be expected to constrain central bank control of
interest rates is by limiting the ability of a central bank to raise
overnight interest rates when this might be needed to restrain spend-
ing and, hence, upward pressure on prices. Here, the argument would
be that high interest rates might have to be avoided in order not to raise
too much the opportunity cost of using central-bank money, giving
private parties an incentive to switch to an alternative payments sys-
tem. But such a concern depends upon the assumption, standard in
textbook treatments of monetary economics, that the rate of interest on
money must be zero, so that “tightening” policy always means raising
the opportunity cost of using central-bank money. Under such an
account, effective monetary policy depends upon the existence of cen-
tral-bank monopoly power in the supply of payments services, so that
the price of its product can be raised at will through sufficient
rationing of supply.
Yet, raising interest rates in no way requires an increase in the
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opportunity cost of central-bank clearing balances, for one can easily
pay interest on these balances, and the interest rate paid on overnight
balances can be raised in tandem with the increase in the target
overnight rate. This is exactly what is done under the “channel” sys-
tems described below. Of course, there is a “technological” reason
why it is difficult to pay an interest rate other than zero on currency.29
But this would not be necessary in order to preserve the central bank’s
control of overnight interest rates. As noted above, the replacement of
currency by other means of payment would pose no problem for mon-
etary control at all. (Highly interest-elastic currency demand would
complicate the implementation of monetary policy, as large open-mar-
ket operations might be needed to accommodate the variations in cur-
rency demand. But this would not undermine or even destabilize the
demand for central-bank balances.) In order to prevent a competitive
threat to the central-bank-managed clearing system, it should suffice
that the opportunity cost of holding overnight clearing balances be
kept low. The evident network externalities associated with the choice
of a payments system, together with the natural advantages of central
banks in performing this function stressed by Freedman (2000),
should then make it likely that many payments would continue to be
settled using central-bank accounts.
My conclusion is that while advances in information technology
may well require changes in the way in which monetary policy is
implemented in countries like the United States, the ability of central
banks to control inflation will not be undermined by advances in infor-
mation technology. And in the case of countries such as Canada,
Australia, or New Zealand, the method of interest-rate control that is
currently used—the “channel” system described below—should con-
tinue to be quite effective, even in the face of the most radical of the
developments that are currently envisioned. I turn now to a further
consideration of the functioning of such a system.
Interest-rate control using standing facilities 2.2
The basic mechanism through which the overnight interest rate in
the interbank market is determined under a “channel” system can be
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explained using Figure 1.30 The model sketched here is intended to
describe determination of the overnight interest rate in a system such
as that of Canada, Australia, or New Zealand, where there are no
reserve requirements.31 Under such a system, the central bank chooses
a target overnight interest rate (indicated by i* in the figure), which is
periodically adjusted in response to changing economic conditions.32
In addition to supplying a certain aggregate quantity of clearing bal-
ances (which can be adjusted through open-market operations), the
central bank offers a lending facility, through which it stands ready to
supply an arbitrary amount of additional overnight balances at a fixed
interest rate. The lending rate is indicated by the level il in Figure 1. In
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, this lending rate is generally set
exactly 25 basis points higher than the target rate.33 Thus, there is
intended to be a small penalty associated with the use of this lending
facility rather than acquiring funds through the interbank market. But
funds are freely available at this facility (upon presentation of suitable
collateral), without the sort of rationing or implicit penalties associat-
ed with discount-window borrowing in the United States.34
Finally, depository institutions that settle payments through the cen-
tral bank also have the right to maintain excess clearing balances
overnight with the central bank at a deposit rate. This rate is indicated
by id in Figure 1. The deposit rate is positive but slightly lower than
the target overnight rate, again so as to penalize banks slightly for not
using the interbank market. Typically, the target rate is the exact cen-
ter of the band whose upper and lower bounds are set by the lending
rate and the deposit rate. Thus, in the countries just mentioned, the
deposit rate is generally set exactly 25 basis points below the target
rate.35 The lending rate, on the one hand, and the deposit rate on the
other then define a channel within which overnight interest rates
should be contained.36 Because these are both standing facilities, no
bank has any reason to pay another bank a higher rate for overnight
cash than the rate at which it could borrow from the central bank; sim-
ilarly, no bank has any reason to lend overnight cash at a rate lower
than the rate at which it can deposit with the central bank.
Furthermore, the spread between the lending rate and the deposit rate
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give banks an incentive to trade with one another (with banks that find
themselves with excess clearing balances lending them to those that
find themselves short) rather than depositing excess funds with the cen-
tral bank when long and borrowing from the lending facility when short.
The result is that the central bank can control overnight interest rates
within a fairly tight range regardless of what the aggregate supply of
clearing balances may be; frequent quantity adjustments accordingly
become less important.
Overnight rate determination under such a system can be explained
fairly simply. The two standing facilities result in an effective supply
curve for clearing balances of the form indicated by schedule S in
Figure 1. The vertical segment is located at , the net supply of clear-
ing balances apart from any obtained through the lending facility. This
is affected by government payments and variations in the currency
demands of banks, in addition to the open-market operations of the
central bank. Under a channel system, the central bank’s target supply
of clearing balances may vary from day to day, but it is adjusted for
technical reasons (for example, the expectation of large payments on
S
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Figure 1
Supply and Demand for Clearing Balances










a particular day) rather than as a way of implementing or signaling
changes in the target overnight rate (as in the United States). The hor-
izontal segment to the right at the lending rate indicates the perfectly
elastic supply of additional overnight balances from the lending facil-
ity. The horizontal segment to the left at the deposit rate indicates that
the payment of interest on deposits puts a floor on how low the equi-
librium overnight rate can fall, no matter how low the demand for
clearing balances may be. The equilibrium overnight rate is then deter-
mined by the intersection of this schedule with a demand schedule for
clearing balances, such as the curve D1 in the figure.37
A simple model of the determinants of the demand for clearing bal-
ances can be derived as follows.38 To simplify, we shall treat the inter-
bank market as a perfectly competitive market, held at a certain point
in time, that occurs after the central bank’s last open-market operation
of the day, but before the banks are able to determine their end-of-day
clearing balances with certainty. The existence of residual uncertainty
at the time of trading in the interbank market is crucial;39 it means that
even after banks trade in the interbank market, they will expect to be
short of funds at the end of the day with a certain probability, and also
to have excess balances with a certain probability.40 Trading in the
interbank market then occurs to the point where the risks of these two
types are just balanced for each bank.
Let the random variable zi denote the net payments to bank i during
a given day; that is, these represent the net additions to its clearing
account at the central bank by the end of the day. At the time of trad-
ing in the interbank market, the value of zi is not yet known with cer-
tainty, although a good bit of the uncertainty will have been resolved.
Let ε i≡ zi – E(zi) represent the eventual end-of-day surprise; here and
below E(.) denotes an expectation conditional upon information at the
time of trading in the interbank market. Let us suppose furthermore
that the random variable εi/σi has a distribution with cdf F for each
bank; here, σi > 0 is a parameter (possibly different from day to day,
for reasons of the sort discussed by Furfine, 2000) that indexes the
degree of uncertainty of bank i. Because of this uncertainty, a bank
that trades in the interbank market to the point where its expected end-
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of-day balance (at the time of trading) is si will have an actual end-of-
day balance equal to si + εi. It is convenient to use si as the bank’s
choice variable in modeling its trading in the interbank market.
A risk-neutral bank should then choose si in order to maximize
expected returns E(R), where its net return R on its overnight balances
at the central bank is equal to
(2.1)
if i is the rate at which overnight funds can be lent or borrowed in the
interbank market. Note that the bank’s net lending in the interbank
market is equal to its beginning-of-day balances plus E(zi) – si; this
differs by a constant (i.e., a quantity that is independent of the bank’s
trading decision) from the quantity –si that enters expression (2.1).
If the cdf F is continuous, the first-order condition for optimal choice
of si is then given by
implying desired overnight balances of
(2.2)
Aggregating over banks i, we obtain the demand schedule plotted in
Figure 1. As one would expect, the demand schedule is decreasing in
i. In the figure, desired balances are shown as becoming quite large as
i approaches id ; this reflects assignment of a small but positive prob-
ability to the possibility of very large negative payments late in the
day, which risk banks will wish to insure against if the opportunity
cost of holding funds overnight with the central bank is low enough.
The market-clearing overnight rate i is then the rate that results in an
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Here, the net supply of clearing balances expected at the time of
trading in the interbank market41 is equal to the central bank’s target
supply of clearing balances , plus a random term u. The latter term
represents variation in the aggregate supply of clearing balances (due
to currency demand by banks or government payments, for example)
that has not been correctly anticipated by the central bank at the time
of its last open-market operation (and so offset), but that has been
revealed by the time of trading in the interbank market.42 The quanti-
ty +u represents the location on the horizontal axis of the vertical
segment of the effective supply schedule in Figure 1. (The figure
depicts equilibrium in the case that u = 0.)
Substitution of (2.2) into (2.3) yields the solution  
(2.4)
As noted above, the market overnight rate is necessarily within the
channel: id ≤ i ≤ il. Its exact position within the channel will be a
decreasing function of the supply of central-bank balances +u. It is
important to note that the interest rates associated with the two stand-
ing facilities play a crucial role in determining the equilibrium
overnight rate, even if the market rate remains always in the interior
of the channel (as is typical in practice, and as is predicted by the
model if the support of εi/σi is sufficiently wide relative to the support
of u). This is because these rates matter not only for the determina-
tion of the location of the horizontal segments of the effective sup-
ply schedule S, but also for the location of the demand schedule D.
Alternatively, the locations of the standing facilities matter because
individual banks do resort to them with positive probability, even
though it is not intended that the overnight rate should ever be driv-
en to either boundary of the channel.
The model predicts an equilibrium overnight rate at the target rate
(the midpoint of the channel),
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when u = 0 (variations in the supply of clearing balances are success-
fully forecasted and offset by the central bank) and the target supply
of clearing balances is equal to
(2.5)
As long as the central bank is sufficiently accurate in estimating the
required supply of clearing balances (2.5) and in eliminating the vari-
ations represented by the term u; the equilibrium fluctuations in the
overnight rate around this value should be small (and it should be near
the target rate on average).
In the case of a symmetric distribution for εi (or any distribution
such that zero is the median as well as the mean), (2.5) implies that the
required target supply of clearing balances should be zero. In practice,
it seems that a small positive level of aggregate clearing balances are
typically desired when the overnight rate remains in the center of the
channel,43 indicating some asymmetry in the perceived risks.44 Thus,
a small positive target level of clearing balances is appropriate; but the
model explains why this can be quite small.
The more important prediction of the model, however, is that the
demand for clearing balances should be a function of the location of
the overnight rate relative to the lending rate and deposit rate, but
independent of the absolute level of any of these interest rates.45 This
means that an adjustment of the level of overnight rates by the central
bank need not require any change in the supply of clearing balances,
as long as the location of the lending and deposit rates relative to the
target overnight rate do not change. Thus, under a channel system,
changes in the level of overnight interest rates are brought about by
simply announcing a change in the target rate, which has the impli-
cation of changing the lending and deposit rates at the central bank’s
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Open-market operations (or their equivalent) are still used under
such a system.46 But rather than being used either to signal or to
enforce a change in the operating target for overnight rates, as in the
United States, these are a purely technical response to daily changes in
the Bank’s forecast of external disturbances to the supply of clearing
balances, and to its forecast of changes in the degree of uncertainty
regarding payment flows. The bank acts each day in order to keep
(S + u)/Σiσi as close as possible to its desired value,47 which desired
value is independent of both the current operating target i* and the rate
i at which the interbank market might currently be trading, unlike the
reaction function of the Trading Desk of the New York Fed described
by Taylor (2001).48
The degree to which the system succeeds in practice in Australia is
shown in Chart 1, which plots the overnight interest rate in since adop-
tion of the complete system described here in June 1998.49 The chan-
nel established by the RBA’s standing facilities is plotted as well. One
observes that the overnight interest rate not only remains well within
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Chart 1
The Overnight Rate since the








































the channel at all times, but that on most days it remains quite close to
the target rate (the center of the channel).
On the dates at which the target rate is adjusted (by 25 or 50 basis
points at a time), the overnight rate immediately jumps to within a few
basis points of the new target level. Furthermore, these changes in the
overnight rate do not require adjustments of the supply of clearing bal-
ances. Both the RBA’s target level50 of clearing balances (ES bal-
ances) and actual overnight balances are plotted in Chart 2. Here, the
vertical dotted lines indicate the dates of the target changes shown in
Chart 1. While there are notable day-to-day variations in both target
and actual balances, these are not systematically lower when the Bank
aims at a higher level of overnight rates. Thus, the ability of the RBA
to “tighten” policy is in no way dependent upon the creation of a
greater “scarcity” of central-bank balances. This is a direct conse-
quence of the fact that interest rates are raised under this system with-
out any attempt to change the spread between market rates of return
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and the interest paid on bank reserves. Instead, the target supply of
clearing balances is frequently adjusted for technical reasons at times
unrelated to policy changes. For example, target balances were more
than doubled during the days spanning the “Y2K” date change, as a
result of increased uncertainty about currency demand, though this
was not associated with any change in the bank’s interest-rate target,
and only modest variation in actual overnight rates.51
A similar system has proven even more strikingly effective in New
Zealand, where it was also adopted at the time of the introduction of
an RTGS payment system, in March 1999.52 Chart 3 provides a simi-
lar plot of actual and target rates, as well as the rates associated with
the standing facilities, in New Zealand under the OCR system. On
most days, the actual overnight rate is equal to the OCR, to the near-
est basis point, so that the dotted line indicating the OCR is not visi-
ble in the figure. Changes in the OCR bring about exactly the same
change in the actual overnight rate, and these occur without any
change in the RBNZ’s “settlement cash target,” which is held fixed (at
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The Overnight Rate under the






































$20 million NZ) during this period, except for an increase (to $200
million NZ) for a few weeks around the “Y2K” date change
(Hampton, 2000).
The accuracy with which the RBNZ achieves its target for overnight
rates (except for occasional deviations that seldom last more than a
day or two) may seem too perfect to be believed. This indicates that
the interbank market in New Zealand is not an idealized auction mar-
ket of the kind assumed in our simple model. Instead, the banks par-
ticipating in this market maintain a convention of trading with one
another at the OCR, except for infrequent occasions when the tempta-
tion to deviate from this norm is evidently too great53 The appeal of
such a convention under ordinary circumstances is fairly obvious.
When the target rate is at the center of the channel, trading at the tar-
get rate implies an equal division of the gains from trade. This may
well seem fair to both parties, and agreeing to the convention has the
advantage of allowing both to avoid the costs of searching for alterna-
tive trading partners or of waiting for further information about that
day’s payment flows to be revealed.
If the central bank is reasonably accurate in choosing the size of its
daily open-market operation, the Walrasian equilibrium overnight rate
(modeled above) is never very far from the center of the channel in
any event, and so no one may perceive much gain from insisting upon
more competitive bidding. Occasional breakdowns of the convention
occur on days when the RBNZ is unable to prevent a large value of u
from occurring, for example on days of unusually large government
payments; on such days, the degree to which the convention requires
asymmetries in bargaining positions to be neglected is too great for all
banks to conform. Thus, even in the presence of such a convention,
our simple model is of some value in explaining the conduct of policy
under a channel system. For preservation of the convention depends
upon the central bank’s arranging things so that the rate that would
represent a Walrasian equilibrium, if such an idealized auction were
conducted, is not too far from the center of the channel.
Chart 4 similarly plots the overnight rate in Canada since the adop-
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tion of the LVTS (Large-Value Transfer System) clearing system in
February 1999.54 Once again, one observes that the channel system
has been quite effective, at least since early in 2000, at keeping the
overnight interest rate not only within the Bank’s 50-basis-point
“operating band” but usually within about one basis point of the target
rate. In the early months of the Canadian system, it is true, the
overnight rate was chronically higher than the target rate, and even
above the upper bound of the operating band (the Bank Rate) at times
of particular liquidity demand.55 This was due to an underestimate of
the supply of clearing balances needed for the market to clear near
the center of the channel. The Bank of Canada had originally thought
that a zero net supply of clearing balances was appropriate (see, e.g.,
Clinton, 1997), but by late in 1999 began instead to target a positive
supply, typically $200 million Canadian, as noted above. This, togeth-
er with some care to adjust of the supply of settlement balances from
day to day in response to variation in the volume of payments, has
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All three of these countries now achieve considerably tighter control
of overnight interest rates in their countries than is achieved, for exam-
ple, under the current operating procedures employed in the United
States. For purposes of comparison, Chart 5 plots the federal funds
rate (the corresponding overnight rate for the United States) since the
beginning of 1999, together with the Fed’s operating target for the
funds rate. It is evident that the daily deviations from the target rate are
larger in the United States.56 Nor can this difference easily be attrib-
uted to differences in the size or structure of the respective economies’
banking systems; for in the first half of the 1990s, both Canada and
New Zealand generally had more volatile overnight interest rates than
did the United States (Sellon and Weiner, 1997, chart 3).
An especially telling comparison regards the way the different sys-
tems were able to deal with the strains created by the increase in
uncertainty about currency demand at the time of the “Y2K” panic. In
the United States, where variations in the supply of Fed balances is the
only tool used to control overnight rates, the Fed’s large year-end
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open-market operations in response to increased currency demand
may have been perceived as implying a desire to reduce the funds rate;
in any event, it temporarily traded more than 150 basis points below
the Fed’s operating target (Taylor, 2001). Subsequent open-market
operations to withdraw the added cash also resulted in a funds rate
well above target weeks after the date change. In New Zealand, large
open-market operations were also conducted, and in addition to
accommodating banks’ demand for currency, the RBNZ’s “settlement
cash target” was increased by a factor of 10. But the use of a channel
system—with the width of the channel substantially narrowed, to only
20 basis points—continued to allow tight control of the overnight rate,
which never deviated at all from the target rate (to the nearest basis
point) during this period (Hampton, 2000). Similarly, in Canada the
overnight money market financing rate never deviated by more than 1
or 2 basis points from the Bank of Canada’s target rate in the days sur-
rounding the change of millennium. In Australia, the cash rate fell to
as much as 6 or 7 basis points below target on some days in the week
before and after the date change, but the deterioration of interest-rate
control was still small and short-lived.57
Given a channel system for the implementation of monetary policy,
like that currently used in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, there
is little reason to fear that improvements in information technology
should undermine the effectiveness of central-bank control of
overnight interest rates. Neither the erosion of reserve requirements
nor improvements in the ability of banks to closely manage their clear-
ing balances should pose particular difficulties for such a system, for
these are exactly the developments that led to the introduction of chan-
nel systems in the countries mentioned, and the systems have, thus far,
worked quite well.
Both the elimination of reserve requirements and increases in the
efficiency with which clearing balances can be tracked should be
expected not only to reduce the quantitative magnitude of the net
demand for overnight central-bank balances, but also to render this
demand less interest sensitive. We have discussed above the way in
which the presence of effective reserve requirements (averaged over a
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maintenance period) makes the daily demand for central-bank bal-
ances more interest sensitive, by increasing the intertemporal substi-
tutability of such demand. The effect of increased ability of banks to
accurately estimate their end-of-day clearing balances can be easily
seen with the help of the model just sketched; reduction of σi for each
of the banks shifts the demand schedule obtained by summing (2.2)
from one like D1 in Figure 1 to one more like D2. In either case, the
reduction in the interest sensitivity of the demand for central-bank bal-
ances increases the risk of volatility of the overnight rate owing to
errors in the central bank’s estimate of the size of open-market opera-
tion required on a given day to fulfill that day’s demand for overnight
balances at the target interest rate, rendering quantity adjustments less
effective as a means of enforcing a bank’s interest-rate target. It is,
thus, not surprising that in all three of the countries discussed, the
channel systems described above were introduced at the time of the
introduction of new, more efficient clearing systems.58
Under such a system, further improvements in the efficiency of the
payments system, tending to render the demand for overnight balances
even less responsive to interest-rate changes, can be offset by a further
narrowing of the width of the channel. Note that (2.2) implies that the
slope of the demand schedule in Figure 1, evaluated near the target
interest rate (midpoint of the channel), is equal to
where µ is the median value of εi/σi and is the proba-
bility density function at that point. Thus, interest-sensitivity is
reduced by reductions in uncertainty about banks’ end-of-day posi-
tions, as noted, but any such change can be offset by a suitable nar-
rowing of the width of the channel il – id, so that the effect upon the
equilibrium overnight rate (in basis points) of a given size error in the
size of the required open-market operation on a particular day (in dol-
lars) would remain unchanged. Since the main reason for not choosing
too narrow a channel—concern that a sufficient incentive remain for
the reallocation of clearing balances among banks through the inter-
f Fµ µ( ) ≡ ′( )
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bank market (Brookes and Hampton, 2000)—becomes less of a con-
cern under the hypothesis of improved forecastability of end-of-day
positions, a narrower channel would seem quite a plausible response.
Nor should a channel system be much affected by the possible
development of novel media for payments. The replacement of cur-
rency by “smart cards” would only simplify day-to-day central bank
control of the supply of clearing balances, ensuring that the target 
would be maintained more reliably. And the creation of alternative
payments networks would probably not result in complete abandon-
ment of the central bank’s system for purposes of final settlement, as
long as the costs of using that system can be kept low. Under a chan-
nel system, the opportunity cost of maintaining clearing balances with
the central bank is equal only to il – id or (assuming an equilibrium
typically near the midpoint of the channel) only half the width of the
channel. This cost is small under current conditions (25 basis points
annually, in the countries under discussion), but might well be made
smaller if improvements in information processing further increase the
accuracy of banks’ monitoring of their clearing balances.
The development of alternative payments systems is likely to lead to
increasing pressure from financial institutions for reduction in the cost
of clearing payments through the central bank, both through reduction
of reserve requirements and through payment of interest on central-
bank balances. And the reduction of such taxes on the use of central-
bank money can be defended on public-finance grounds even under
current conditions.59 From this point of view as well, the channel sys-
tems of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand may well represent the
future of payment systems worldwide.
It is worth noting, however, that a consideration of the usefulness of
a channel system for monetary control leads to a somewhat different
perspective on the payment of interest on reserves than is often found
in discussions of that issue from the point of view solely of tax policy.
For example, it is sometimes proposed that it might be sufficient to
pay interest on required reserves only, rather than on total central-bank
balances, on the grounds that a tax that cannot be avoided (or can be
S
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avoided only by reducing the scale of one’s operations) is an especial-
ly onerous one. But if there continues to be zero interest on “excess
reserves,” then the interest rate on marginal central-bank balances
continues not to be adjusted with changes in the target level of
overnight rates, and it continues to be the case that changes in the
overnight rate must be brought about through changes in the degree to
which the supply of central-bank balances is rationed.
Similarly, it is often supposed that the interest that should be paid on
reserves on efficiency grounds should be a rate that is tied to market
interest rates. This may seem to follow immediately from the fact that
the spread i – id is analogous to a tax on holding balances overnight
with the central bank; fixing id to equal i minus a constant spread
would then be a way of keeping this tax rate constant over time. But
raising the deposit rate automatically with increases in the overnight
rate means that such increases will no longer increase the opportunity
cost of holding overnight balances; this will make the demand for
overnight balances much less interest-sensitive, and so make control
of the overnight rate by the central bank more difficult, if not impos-
sible.60 Tying the deposit rate to the target overnight rate, as in the
channel systems just described, instead helps to keep the market rate
near the target rate. In equilibrium, the spread between the market
overnight rate and the deposit rate should thereby be kept from vary-
ing much, so that the goal of a fairly constant effective tax rate is also
achieved. But with this approach to the problem of reducing the cost
of holding overnight balances, the twin goals of microeconomic effi-
ciency and macroeconomic stability can both be served.
Interest-rate control in the absence of monetary frictions 3
I have argued that there is little reason to fear that improvements in
information technology should threaten the ability of central banks to
control overnight interest rates, and, hence, to pursue their stabiliza-
tion goals in much the way they do at present; indeed, increased
opportunity to influence market expectations should make it possible
for monetary policy to be even more effective. There is nothing to fear
from increased efficiency of information transmission in markets,
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because the effectiveness of monetary policy depends neither upon
fooling market participants nor upon the manipulation of market dis-
tortions that depend upon monopoly power on the part of the central
bank.
Some will doubtless wonder if this can really be true. They may feel
that such an optimistic view fails to address the puzzle upon which
Friedman (1999) remarks: If banks have no special powers at their dis-
posal, how can it be that such small trades by central banks can move
rates in such large markets? In the complete absence of any monopoly
power on the part of central banks—because their liabilities no longer
supply any services not also supplied by other equally riskless, equal-
ly liquid financial claims—it might be thought that any remaining
ability of central banks to affect market rates would have to depend
upon a capacity to adjust their balance sheets by amounts that are large
relative to the overall size of financial markets.
Of course, one might still propose that central banks should be able
to engage in trades of any size that turned out to be required, owing to
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Figure 2
The Interbank Market When Central-Bank Balances







the fact that the government stands behind the central bank and can
use its power of taxation to make up any trading losses, even huge
ones.61 But I shall argue instead that massive adjustments of central-
bank balance sheets would not be necessary in order to move interest
rates, even in a world where central-bank liabilities ceased to supply
any services in addition to their pecuniary yield. Thus, the claim that
banks should still be as effective at pursuing their stabilization objec-
tives in a world with informationally efficient financial markets does
not depend upon a supposition that central banks ought to be willing
to trade on a much more ambitious scale than they do at present.
The source of central-bank control of short-term 
interest rates 3.1
In our discussion above, we have supposed that even in the future
there would continue to be some small demand for central-bank bal-
ances (if only for clearing purposes) at a positive opportunity cost. But
the logic of the method of interest-rate control sketched above does
not really depend upon this. Let us suppose instead that balances held
with the central bank cease to be any more useful to commercial banks
than any other equally riskless overnight investment. In this case, the
demand for central-bank balances would collapse to a vertical line at
zero for all interest rates higher than the settlement cash rate, as shown
in Chart 5, together with a horizontal line to the right at the settlement
cash rate. That is, banks should still be willing to hold arbitrary bal-
ances at the central bank, as long as (but only if) the overnight cash
rate is no higher than the rate paid by the central bank. In this case, it
would no longer be possible to induce the overnight cash market to
clear at a target rate. higher than the rate paid on settlement balances.
But the central bank could still control the equilibrium overnight
rate, by choosing a positive settlement cash target, so that the only
possible equilibrium would be at an interest rate equal to the settle-
ment cash rate, as shown in Chart 5. Such a system would differ from
current channel systems in that an overnight lending facility would no
longer be necessary, so that there would no longer be a “channel.”62
And the rate paid on central-bank balances would no longer be set at
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a fixed spread below the target overnight rate; instead, it would be set
at exactly the target rate. But perfect control of overnight rates should
still be possible through adjustments of the rate paid on overnight cen-
tral-bank balances,63, 64 and changes in the target overnight rate would
not have to involve any change in the settlement cash target, just as is
true under current channel systems. Indeed, in this limiting case, vari-
ations in the supply of central-bank balances would cease to have any
effect at all upon the equilibrium overnight rate. Thus, it would be
essential to move from a system like that of the United States a pres-
ent—in which variations in the supply of Fed balances is the only tool
used to affect the overnight rate, while the interest rate paid on these
balances is never varied at all 65—to one in which instead variations
in overnight rates are achieved purely through variations in the rate
paid on Fed balances, and not at all through supply variations.
How can interest-rate variation be achieved without any adjustment
at all of the supply of central-bank balances? Certainly, if a govern-
ment decides to peg the price of some commodity, it may be able to
do so, but only by holding stocks of the commodity that are suffi-
ciently large relative to the world market for that commodity, and by
standing ready to vary its holdings of the commodity by large amounts
as necessary. What is different about controlling short-term nominal
interest rates?
The difference is that there is no inherent “equilibrium” level of
interest rates to which the market would tend in the absence of central-
bank intervention, and against which the central bank must, therefore,
exert a significant countervailing force in order to achieve a given
operating target.66 This is because there is no inherent value (in
terms of real goods and services) for a fiat unit of account such as the
“dollar,” except insofar as a particular exchange value results from the
monetary policy commitments of the central bank.67 Alternative price-
level paths are, thus, equally consistent with market equilibrium in the
absence of any intervention that would vary the supply of any real
goods or services to the private sector. And associated with these alter-
native paths for the general level of prices are alternative paths for
short-term nominal interest rates.
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Of course, this analysis might suggest that while central banks can
bring about an arbitrary level of nominal interest rates (by creating
expectations of the appropriate rate of inflation), they should not be
able to significantly affect real interest rates, except through trades
that are large relative to the economy that they seek to affect. It may
also suggest that banks should be able to move nominal rates only by
altering inflation expectations; yet, banks generally do not feel that
they can easily alter expectations of inflation over the near term, so
that one might doubt that banks should be able to affect short-term
nominal rates through such a mechanism.
However, once one recognizes that many prices (and wages) are
fairly sticky over short time intervals, the arbitrariness of the path of
nominal prices (in the sense of their underdetermination by real fac-
tors alone) implies that the path of real activity, and the associated path
of equilibrium real interest rates, are equally arbitrary. It is equally
possible, from a logical standpoint, to imagine allowing the central
bank to determine, by arbitrary fiat, the path of aggregate real activi-
ty, or the path of real interest rates, or the path of nominal interest
rates, as it is to imagine allowing it to determine the path of nominal
interest rates.68 In practice, it is easiest for central banks to exert rela-
tively direct control over overnight nominal interest rates, and so
banks generally formulate their short-run objectives (their operating
target) in terms of the effect that they seek to bring about in this vari-
able rather than one of the others.
Even recognizing the existence of a very large set of rational expec-
tations equilibria—equally consistent with optimizing private-sector
behavior and with market clearing, in the absence of any specification
of monetary policy—one might, nonetheless, suppose, as Fischer
Black (1970) once did, that in a fully deregulated system the central
bank should have no way of using monetary policy to select among
these alternative equilibria. The path of money prices (and similarly
nominal interest rates, nominal exchange rates, and so on) would then
be determined solely by the self-fulfilling expectations of market par-
ticipants. Why should the central bank play any special role in deter-
mining which of these outcomes should actually occur, if it does not
Monetary Policy in the Information Economy 345
possess any monopoly power as the unique supplier of some crucial
service?
The answer is that the unit of account in a purely fiat system is
defined in terms of the liabilities of the central bank.69 A financial con-
tract that promises to deliver a certain number of U.S. dollars at a
specified future date is promising payment in terms of Federal Reserve
notes or clearing balances at the Fed (which are treated as freely con-
vertible into one another by Fed). Even in the technological utopia
imagined by the enthusiasts of “electronic money”—where financial
market participants are willing to accept as final settlement transfers
made over electronic networks in which the central bank is not
involved—if debts are contracted in units of a national currency, then
clearing balances at the central bank will still define the thing to which
these other claims are accepted as equivalent.
This explains why the nominal interest yield on clearing balances at
the central bank can determine overnight rates in the market as a
whole. The central bank can obviously define the nominal yield on
overnight deposits in its clearing accounts as it chooses; it is simply
promising to increase the nominal amount credited to a given account,
after all. It can also determine this independently of its determination
of the quantity of such balances that it supplies. Commercial banks
may exchange claims to such deposits among themselves on whatev-
er terms they like. But the market value of a dollar deposit in such an
account cannot be anything other than a dollar—because this defines
the meaning of a “dollar!” This places the Fed in a different situation
than any other issuer of dollar-denominated liabilities.70 Citibank can
determine the number of dollars that one of its jumbo CDs will be
worth at maturity, but must then allow the market to determine the cur-
rent dollar value of such a claim; it cannot determine both the quanti-
ty that it wishes to issue of such claims and the interest yield on them.
Yet, the Fed can, and does so daily—though as we have noted, at pres-
ent, it chooses to fix the interest yield on Fed balances at zero and only
to vary the supply. The Fed’s current position as monopoly supplier of
an instrument that serves a special function is necessary in order for
variations in the quantity supplied to affect the equilibrium spread
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between this interest rate and other market rates, but not in order to
allow separate determination of the interest rate on central-bank bal-
ances and the quantity of them in existence.
Yes, someone may respond, a central bank would still be able to
determine the interest rate on overnight deposits at the central bank,
and, thus, the interest rate in the interbank market for such claims,
even in a world of completely frictionless financial markets. But
would control of this interest rate necessarily have consequences for
other market rates, the ones that matter for critical intertemporal deci-
sions such as investment spending? The answer is that it must—and all
the more so in a world in which financial markets have become high-
ly efficient, so that arbitrage opportunities created by discrepancies
among the yields on different market instruments are immediately
eliminated. Equally riskless short-term claims issued by the private
sector (say, shares in a money-market mutual fund holding very short-
term Treasury bills) would not be able to promise a different interest
rate than the one available on deposits at the central bank; otherwise,
there would be excess supply or demand for the private-sector instru-
ments. And determination of the overnight interest rate would also
have to imply determination of the equilibrium overnight holding
return on longer-lived securities, up to a correction for risk; and so,
determination of the expected future path of overnight interest rates
would essentially determine longer-term interest rates.
Could we privatize money? 3.2
The special feature of central banks, then, is simply that they are
entities the liabilities of which happen to be used to define the unit of
account in a wide range of contracts that other people exchange with
one another. There is perhaps no deep, universal reason why this need
be so; it is certainly not essential that there be one such entity per
national political unit. Nonetheless, the provision of a well-managed
unit of account—one in terms of which the equilibrium prices of many
goods and services will be relatively stable—clearly facilitates eco-
nomic life. And given the evident convenience of having a single unit
of account be used by most of the parties with whom one wishes to
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trade, one may well suppose that this function should properly contin-
ue to be taken on by the government.
Nonetheless, it is worth remarking that there is no reason of princi-
ple for prohibiting private entry into this activity—apart from the
usual concerns with the prevention of fraud and financial panics that
require regulation of the activities of financial intermediaries in gen-
eral. One might imagine, as Hayek (1986) did, a future in which pri-
vate entities manage competing monetary standards in terms of which
people might choose to contract. Even in such a world, the Fed would
still be able to control the exchange value of the U.S. dollar against
goods and services by adjusting the nominal interest rate paid on Fed
balances. The exchange value of the U.S. dollar in terms of private
currencies would depend upon the respective monetary policies of the
various issuers, just as is true of the determination of exchange rates
among different national currencies today.
In such a world, would central banks continue to matter? This would
depend upon how many people still chose to contract in terms of the
currencies the values of which they continued to determine. Under
present circumstances, it is quite costly for most people to attempt to
transact in a currency other than the one issued by their national gov-
ernment, because of the strong network externalities associated with
such a choice, even though there are often no legal barriers to con-
tracting in another currency. But in a future in which transactions costs
of all sorts have been radically reduced, that might no longer be the
case, and, if so, the displacement of national currencies by private
payment media might come to be possible.71 Would this be a disaster
for macroeconomic stability?
It is hard to see why it should be. The choice to transact in terms of
a particular currency, when several competing alternatives are avail-
able, would presumably be made on the basis of an expectation that
the currency in question would be managed in a way that would make
its use convenient. Above all, this should mean stability of its value,
so that fixing a contract wage or price in these units will not lead to
large distortions over the lifetime of the contract (or so that compli-
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cated indexation schemes will not need to be added to contracts to off-
set the effects of instability in the currency’s value). Thus, competition
between currencies should increase the chances that at least some of
those available would establish reputations for maintaining stable val-
ues. Of course, the relevant sense in which the value of a currency
should remain stable is that the prices of those goods and services
that happen to be priced in that currency should remain as stable as
possible.72 Thus, one might imagine “currency blocs” developing in
different sectors of a national economy between which there would be
substantial relative-price variations even in the case of fully flexible
prices, with firms in each sector choosing to transact in a currency that
is managed in a way that serves especially to stabilize the prices of the
particular types of goods and services in their sector.73 The develop-
ment of a system of separate currency blocs not corresponding to
national boundaries, or to any political units at all, might then have
efficiency advantages.
Thus, a future is conceivable in which improvements in the effi-
ciency of communications and information processing so change the
financial landscape that national central banks cease to control any-
thing that matters to national economies. Yet, even such a develop-
ment would not mean that nominal prices would cease to be deter-
mined by anything, and would be left to the vagaries of self-fulfilling
expectations—with the result that, due to wage and price stickiness,
the degree to which productive resources are properly utilized would
be hostage to these same arbitrary expectations. Such a future could
only occur if the functions of central banks today are taken over by
private issuers of means of payment, who are able to stabilize the val-
ues of the currencies that they issue. And if in some distant future this
important function comes to be supplied by private organizations, it is
likely that they will build upon the techniques for inflation control
being developed by central banks in our time.
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Appendix
Market Participation and the Effectiveness of
Open-Market Operations
The following simple model may help to clarify the point made in
section 1.1 about the illusory benefit that derives from increasing the
central bank’s leverage over market rates by making the bank’s inter-
ventions as much of a surprise as possible. Let the economy be made
up of a group of households indexed by j, each of which chooses con-
sumption C j, end-of-period money balances M j, and end-of-period
bond holdings B j, to maximize an objective of the form
(A.1)
where u is an increasing, concave function of consumption and real
money balances, P is the current-period price level, i is the nominal
interest yield on the bonds between the current period and the next,
and λ j > 0 is the household’s discounted expected marginal utility of
nominal wealth in the following period. I assume here for simplicity
that the expected marginal utility of wealth λ j is affected only negli-
gibly by a household’s saving and portfolio decisions in the current
period, because the cost of consumption expenditure and the interest
foregone on money balances for a single period are small relative to
the household’s total wealth; we, thus, treat λ j as a given constant
(though, of course, in a more complete model it depends upon expec-
tations about equilibrium in subsequent periods, including future mon-
etary policy).
Each household chooses these variables subject to a budget con-
straint of the form
(A.2)
where Wj is the household’s nominal wealth to be allocated among the
three uses. This last can be partitioned into the household’s bond hold-
ings j prior to the end-of-period trading in which the central bank’s
open-market operations are conducted and the other sources of wealth
. I suppose, finally, that only a fraction γ of the households partic-˜ j
B
M B PC W W Bj j j j j j+ + ≤ = +˜ ,
u C M P M i Bj j j j j, / ,( ) + + +( )( )λ 1
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ipate in this end-of-period bond trading; the choices of the other
households are subject to the additional constraint that
(A.3)
whether or not this would be optimal in the absence of the constraint.
Because advance notice of the central bank’s intention to conduct an
open-market operation will, in general, make the previously chosen
no longer optimal, I suppose that greater publicity would increase
the participation rate γ; but I do not here explicitly model the participa-
tion decision, instead considering only the consequences of alternative
values of γ. All households are assumed to choose their consumption
and, hence, their end-of-period money balances only after the size of
the open-market operation has been revealed; P and i are, thus, each
determined only after revelation of this information.
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal decision of each house-
hold satisfies the first-order condition
(A.4)
In the case of households that participate in the end-of-period bond
market, there is an additional first-order condition
(A.5)
Using (A.4) to eliminate λ j in (A.5), one obtains a relation that can
be solved (under the standard assumption that both consumption and
real balances are normal goods) for desired real balance
(A.6)
where the money demand function L is increasing in real purchases Cj
and decreasing in the interest rate i. The optimal decisions of these
households are then determined by (A.2), (A.4), and (A.5) (or equiva-
lently (A.6)). The optimal decisions of the households that do not par-
ticipate in the final bond trading are, instead, determined by the first
two of these relations and by the constraint (A.3) instead of (A.5). 
In the case of the non-participating households, these conditions
M P L C ij j/ , ,= ( )
u C M P Pim j j j, / .( ) = λ
u C M P u C M P Pc j j m j j j, / , / .( ) − ( ) = λ
j
B Bj j= ,
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have a solution of the form
(A.7)
(A.8)
Bond holdings are, of course, given by (A.3). Note that these house-
holds’ decisions are unaffected by the bond yield i determined in the
end-of-period trading. In the case of participating households, condi-
tions (A.4) and (A.5) can instead be solved to yield
(A.9)
(A.10)
In the standard case, both cp and mp will be decreasing functions of i.
The implied demand for bonds is then given by
(A.11)
where
Now, suppose that the central bank increases the money supply by a
quantity ∆M per capita, through an open-market operation that reduces
the supply of bonds by this same amount. The effect on the interest
rate i is then determined by the requirement that participating house-
holds must be induced to reduce their bond holdings by an aggregate
quantity equal to the size of the open market operation. The interest
rate required for this is determined by aggregating (A.11) over the set 
of participating households. In the simple case that they are all identi-
cal, the equilibrium condition is




,( ) = + −1∆
d P i c P i m P ij p j p jλ λ λ, , , .( ) ≡ ( ) + ( )
B W B d P ij j j j= + − ( )˜ , ,λ
M P m P ij p j/ , .= ( )λ
C c P ij jp= ( )λ , ,
M P m W P Pj np j j/ ˜ / , .= ( )λ
C c W P Pj np j j= ( )˜ / , ,λ
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as each participating household must be induced to sell γ -1 times its per
capita share of the bonds purchased by the central bank. It is obvious
that the resulting interest-rate decline is larger (for a given size of ∆M
and a given price level) the smaller is γ. This is favored by “catching
the markets off guard” when conducting an open-market operation.
But this need not mean any larger effect of the open-market opera-
tion on aggregate demand. The consumption demands of the fraction
1–γ of households not participating in the end-of-period bond market
are independent of i. While the expenditure of the participating house-
holds (at a given price level P) is stimulated more as a result of the
greater decline in interest rates (this follows from (A.9), there are also
fewer of them. Thus there need be no greater effect on aggregate
demand from the greater interest-rate decline.
Note that when the interest rate is determined by (A.12), the implied
consumption demand on the part of participating households is given by 
This follows from the fact that the consumption of these house-
holds satisfies (A.2) and (A.4) just as in the case of the non-
participating households, but with the equilibrium condition
instead of = . Aggregate real expenditure is
then given by
The partial derivative of C with respect to ∆M, evaluated at ∆M = 0,
is equal to







= ( ) >1 0˜ , ,
C c W M P c W Pnp np= +( ) + −( ) ( )−γ γ λ γ λ˜ , ˜ , .1 1∆
BtjBtjB Btj t j= − −γ 1∆Μ
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Endnotes
1 See equation (A.12) in the Appendix.
2 Blinder et al. (2001) defend secrecy with regard to foreign-exchange market inter-
ventions on this ground, though they find little ground for secrecy with regard to the
conduct or formulation of monetary policy.
3 Allan Meltzer, however, assures me that his own intention was never to present
this analysis as a normative proposal, as opposed to a positive account of actual cen-
tral-bank behavior.
4 Yet even many proponents of that model of aggregate supply would not endorse
the conclusion that it therefore makes sense for a central bank to seek to exploit its
informational advantage in order to achieve output-stabilization goals. Much of the
“New Classical” literature of the 1970s instead argued that the conditions under which
successful output stabilization would be possible were so stringent as to recommend
that central banks abandon any attempt to use monetary policy for such ends.
5 See Woodford (2001, chapter 3) for detailed discussion of the microeconomic
foundations of the aggregate-supply relation (1.1), and comparison of it with the
“New Classical” specification. Examples of recent analyses of monetary policy
options employing this specification include Goodfriend and King (1997), McCallum
and Nelson (1999), and Clarida et al. (1999).
6 See Woodford (2001, chapter 3) for further discussion. A number of recent papers
find a substantially better fit between this equation and empirical inflation dynamics
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when data on real unit labor costs are used to measure the “output gap,” rather than a
more conventional output-based measure. See, e.g., Sbordone (1998), Gali and Gertler
(1999), and Gali et al., (2000).
7 This is the foundation offered for the effect of interest rates on aggregate demand
in the simple optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism used in
papers such as Kerr and King (1996), McCallum and Nelson (1999), and Clarida et al.
(1999), and expounded in Woodford (2001, chap. 4).
8 Examples of recent discussions of the issue by central bankers include Issing
(2001) and Jenkins (2001).
9 We have mentioned above the important shift to immediate announcement of tar-
get changes since February 1994. Demiralp and Jorda (2001a) argue that markets have
actually had little difficulty correctly understanding the Fed’s target changes since
November 1989. Lange et al. (2001) detail a series of changes in the Fed’s communi-
cation with the public since 1994 that have further increased the degree to which it
gives explicit hints about the likelihood of future changes in policy.
10 It is crucial here to recognize that there is no unique equilibrium path for inter-
est rates that markets would tend to in the absence of an interest-rate policy on the part
of the central bank. See further discussion in Section 3.
11 Giannoni and Woodford (2001) discuss how policy rules can be designed that
can be specified without any reference to particular economic disturbances, but that,
nonetheless, imply an optimal equilibrium response to additive disturbances of an
arbitrary type. The targeting rules advocated by Svensson (2001) are examples of
rules of this kind.
12 A concrete example of such principles and how they can be applied is provided
in Giannoni and Woodford (2001).
13 Costa and De Grauwe (2001) instead argue that central banks are currently large
players in many national financial markets. But they agree with Friedman that there is
a serious threat of loss of monetary control if central bank balances sheets shrink in
the future as a result of financial innovation.
14 Henckel et al. (1999) review similar developments, though they reach a very dif-
ferent conclusion about the threat posed to the efficacy of monetary policy.
15 Gormez and Capie (2000) report the results of surveys conducted at trade fairs
for smart-card innovators held in London in 1999 and 2000. In the 1999 survey, 35
percent of the exhibitors answered “Yes” to the question “Do you think that electronic
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cash has a potential to replace central bank money?” while another 47 percent replied
“To a certain extent.” Of those answering “Yes,” 22 percent predicted that this should
occur before 2005, another 33 percent before 2010, and all but 17 percent predicted
that it should occur before 2020.
16 See, e.g., Bennett and Peristiani (2001).
17 For example, it accounts for more than 84 percent of central bank liabilities in
countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Japan (Bank for International Settlements,
1996, Table 1).
18 See, e.g., McCallum (1999, sec. 5).
19 See Woodford (2001, chaps. 2 and 4) for an argument that “real-balance effects,”
a potential channel through which variation in monetary aggregates may affect spend-
ing quite apart from the path of interest rates, are quantitatively trivial in practice.
20This is obviously true of a bank that, like the U.S. Federal Reserve since the late
1980s, uses open-market operations to try to achieve an operating target for the
overnight rate; maintaining the fed funds rate near the target requires the Fed to pre-
vent variations in the supply of Fed balances that are not justified by any changes in
the demand for such balances. But it is also true of operating procedures such as the
nonborrowed-reserves targeting practiced by the Fed between 1979 and 1982 (Gilbert,
1985). While this was a type of quantity targeting regime that allowed substantial
volatility in the funds rate, maintaining a target for the supply of nonborrowed
reserves also required the Fed to automatically accommodate variations in currency
demand through open-market operations.
21 A somewhat more distant, but not inconceivable prospect is that “electronic cash”
could largely replace payment by checks drawn on bank accounts, thus reducing the
demand for deposits subject to reserve requirements. For a recent discussion of the prospects
for e-cash as a substitute for conventional banking, see Claessens et al. (2001).
22 Again see Bennett and Peristiani (2001). Reductions in legal reserve require-
ments in 1990 and 1992 have contributed to the same trend over the past decade.
23 See Borio (1997), Sellon and Weiner (1996, 1997) and Henckel et al. (1999).
24 Roughly the same quantity of Fed balances represent “required clearing bal-
ances.” These are amounts that banks agree to hold on average in their accounts at the
Fed, in addition to their required reserves; the banks are compensated for these bal-
ances, in credit that can be used to pay for various services for which the Fed charges
(Meulendyke, 1998, chap. 6). However, the balances classified this way do not fully
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measure the demand for clearing balances. Banks’ additional balances, classified as
“excess reserves,” are also held largely to facilitate clearing; these represent balances
that the banks choose to hold ex post, above the “required balances” negotiated with
the Fed in advance of the reserve maintenance period. Furthermore, the balances held
to satisfy reserve requirements also facilitate clearing, insofar as they must be main-
tained only on average over a two-week period, and not at the end of each day. Thus,
in the absence of reserve requirements, the demand for Fed balances might well be
nearly as large as it is at present.
25 Fluctuations in the net supply of overnight balances, apart from those due to cen-
tral-bank open-market operations, occur as a result of government payments that are
not fully offset by open-market operations, while fluctuations in the net demand for
such balances by banks result from day-to-day variation in un-certainty about pay-
ment flows and variation in the efficiency with which the interbank market succeeds
in matching banks with excess clearing balances with those that are short.
26 This is emphasized by Furfine, for whom it is crucial in explaining how patterns
in daily interbank payments flows can create corresponding patterns in daily varia-
tions in the funds rate. However, the system of compensating banks for committing
themselves to hold a certain average level of “required clearing balances” over a two-
week maintenance period introduces similar intertemporal substitution into the
demand for Fed balances, even in the absence of reserve requirements.
27 The increase in funds rate volatility in 1991 following the reduction in reserve
requirements is often interpreted in this way; see, e.g., Clouse and Elmendorf (1997).
However, declines in required reserve balances since then have to some extent been
offset by increased holdings of required clearing balances, and this is probably the rea-
son that funds rate volatility has not been notably higher in recent years.
28 See also the views of electronic-money innovators reported in Gormez and
Capie (2000). In the 2000 survey described there, 57 percent of respondents felt that
e-money technologies “can ... eliminate the power of central banks as the sole
providers of monetary base in the future (by offering alternative monies issued by
other institutions).” And 48 percent of respondents predicted that these technologies
would “lead to a ‘free banking’ era (a system of competing technologies issued by var-
ious institutions and without a central bank).” Examples of “digital currency” systems
currently being promoted are discussed at the Standard Transactions website,
http://www.standardtransactions.com/digitalcurrencies.html.
29 Goodhart (1986) and McCulloch (1986), nonetheless, propose a method for pay-
ing interest on currency as well, through a lottery based upon the serial numbers of
individual notes.
30 For details of these systems, see, e.g., Archer et al., (1999), Bank of Canada
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(1999), Borio (1997), Brookes and Hampton (2000), Campbell (1998), Clinton
(1997), Reserve Bank of Australia (1998), Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1999), and
Sellon and Weiner (1997).
31 Of course, standing facilities may be provided even in the presence of reserve
requirements, as is currently the case at the European Central Bank. The ECB’s stand-
ing facilities do not establish nearly so narrow a “channel” as in the case of Canada,
Australia and New Zealand—except for a period in early 1999 just after the introduc-
tion of the euro, it has had a width of 200 basis points, rather than only 50 basis points
—and open market operations in response to deviations of overnight rates from the
target rate play a larger role in the control of overnight rates, as in the United States
(European Central Bank, 2001). We also here abstract from the complications result-
ing from the U.S. regulations relating to “required clearing balances,” which result in
substitutability of clearing balances across days within the same two-week reserve
maintenance period, as discussed above.
32 This is called the “target rate” in Canada and Australia, and the “official cash rate”
(OCR) in New Zealand; in all of these countries, changes in the central bank’s operat-
ing target are announced in terms of changes in this rate. The RBNZ prefers not to refer
to a “target” rate in order to make it clear that the Bank does not intend to intervene in
the interbank market to enforce trading at this rate. In Canada, until this year, the exis-
tence of the target rate was not emphasized in the Bank’s announcements of policy
changes; instead, more emphasis was given to the boundaries of the “operating band”
or channel, and policy changes were announced in terms of changes in the “Bank Rate”
(the upper bound of the channel). But the midpoint of the “operating band” was under-
stood to represent the Bank’s target rate (Bank of Canada, 1999), and the Bank of
Canada has recently adopted the practice of announcing changes in its target rate (see,
e.g., Bank of Canada, 2001b), in conformity with the practices of other central banks.
33 In New Zealand, the lending rate (Overnight Repo Facility rate) was briefly
reduced to only 10 basis points above the OCR during the period spanning the “Y2K”
date change, as discussed further below.
34 Economists at the RBA believe that there remains some small stigma associated
with use of the Bank’s lending (overnight repo) facility, despite the Bank’s insistence
that “overnight repos are there to be used,” as long as the same bank does not need
them day after day. Nonetheless, the facility is used with some regularity, and clearly
serves a different function than the U.S. discount window. One of the more obvious
differences is that in the U.S., the Fed consistently chooses a target funds rate that is
above the discount rate, making it clear that there is no intention to freely supply funds
at the discount rate, while the banks with channel systems always choose a target rate
below the rate associated with their overnight lending facilities. Lending at the Fed’s
discount window is also typically for a longer term than overnight (say, for two
weeks), and is thus not intended primarily as a means of dealing with daily overdrafts
in clearing accounts.
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35 In each of the three countries mentioned, as leading examples of this kind of sys-
tem, a “channel” width of 50 basis points is currently standard. However, the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand briefly narrowed its “channel” to a width of only 20 basis points
late in 1999, in order to reduce the cost to banks of holding larger-than-usual overnight
balances in order to deal with possible unusual liquidity demands resulting from the
“Y2K” panic (Hampton, 2000). It is also worth noting that when the Reserve Bank of
Australia first established its deposit facility, it paid a rate only 10 basis points below
the target cash rate. This, however, was observed to result in substantial unwillingness
of banks to lend in the interbank market, as a result of which the rate was lowered to
25 basis points below the target rate (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1998). 
36 It is arguable that the actual lower bound is somewhat above the deposit rate,
because of the convenience and lack of credit risk associated with the deposit facility,
and similarly that the actual upper bound is slightly above the lending rate, because of
the collateral requirements and possible stigma associated with the lending facility.
Nonetheless, market rates are observed to stay within the channel established by these
rates (except for occasional slight breaches of the upper bound during the early
months of operation of Canada’s system—see Chart 4), and typically near its center.
37 This analysis is similar to a traditional analysis, such as that of Gilbert (1985),
of federal funds rate determination under U.S. operating procedures. But under U.S.
arrangements, there is no horizontal segment to the left (or rather, this occurs only at
a zero funds rate), and the segment extending to the right is steeply sloped, owing to
rationing at the discount window. In recent years, U.S. banks have indicated consid-
erable reluctance to borrow at the discount window, so that the entire schedule may be
treated as essentially vertical. However, a static analysis of this kind is only possible
for the United States if the model is taken to refer to averages over a two-week reserve
maintenance period, as Gilbert notes. Hence, the existence of a Trading Desk reaction
function of the kind described by Taylor (2001), in which the Desk’s open market
operations each day respond to the previous day’s discrepancy between the funds rate
and the Fed’s target, should give the effective supply schedule over a maintenance
period an upward slope in the case of the United States.
38 The account given here closely follows Henckel et al. (1999) and Guthrie and
Wright (2000).
39 In Furfine’s (2000) model of the daily U.S. interbank market, this residual uncer-
tainty represents the possibility of “operational glitches, bookkeeping mistakes, or
payments expected from a counterparty that fail to arrive before the closing of
Fedwire.”
40 In practice, lending in the interbank market is observed to occur at a rate above
the central banks deposit rate, despite the existence of a positive net supply of clear-
ing balances, even when there is a “closing period” at the end of the day in which
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trades in the interbank market for overnight clearing balances are still possible while
no further payments may be posted. Even though trading is possible at a time at which
banks know the day’s payment flows with certainty, it is sufficiently inconvenient for
them to wait until the “closing period” to arrange their trades that a substantial amount
of trading occurs earlier, and, hence, under uncertainty of the kind assumed in the
model. The model’s assumption that all trading in the interbank market occurs at a sin-
gle point in time, and that the market is cleared at a single rate by a Walrasian “auc-
tioneer,” is obviously an abstraction, but one that is intended to provide insight into
the basic determinants of the average overnight rate.
41 This need not equal the actual end-of-day supply, apart from borrowings from
the lending facility, if there remains uncertainty about the size of government pay-
ments yet to be received by the end of the day.
42 Nontrivial discrepancies frequently exist between the target and actual supplies
of clearing balances; see, e.g., Chart 2 in the case of Australia. The procedures used
in Canada evidently allow precise targeting of the total supply of clearing balances;
furthermore, the Bank of Canada’s target level of balances for a given day is always
announced by 4:30 p.m. the previous day (Bank of Canada, 2001a). Thus, for Canada,
u = 0 each day.
43 In New Zealand, the “settlement cash target” since adoption of the OCR system
has generally been fixed at $20 million NZ. At the Bank of Canada, the target level of
clearing balances was actually zero during the early months of the LVTS system. But,
as is discussed below, this did not work well. Since late in 1999, the Bank has
switched to targeting a positive level of clearing balances, initially about $200 million
Canadian, and higher on days when especially high transactions volume is expected
(Bank of Canada, 1999, Addendum II). The target level is now ordinarily $50 mil-
lion Canadian (Bank of Canada, 2001a). In Australia, the target level varies substan-
tially from day to day (see Chart 2), but is currently typically about $750 million
Australian.
44 This may be because the effective lower bound is actually slightly above the
deposit rate, and the effective upper bound is slightly above the lending rate, as dis-
cussed in footnote 36. Hence, existing channel systems are not quite as symmetric as
they appear.
45 Here, I abstract from possible effects upon the σi of changes in the volume of
spending in the economy as a result of a change in the level of overnight interest rates.
These are likely to be small relative to other sources of day-to-day variation in the σi
and not to occur immediately in response to a change in the target overnight rate.
46 The Bank of Canada neutralizes the effects of payments to or from the govern-
ment upon the supply of clearing balances through a procedure of direct transfer of
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government deposits, but this technique has exactly the same effect as an open-mar-
ket operation.
47 For example, given that this desired value is a small positive quantity, the Bank
of Canada increases its target on days when high transactions volume is expected,
given that this higher volume of payments increases the uncertainty σi for the banks.
Similarly, maintaining a constant expected supply of clearing balances requires that
predictable variations in currency demand or government payments be offset through
open-market operations, and minimization of the variance of u requires the Bank to
monitor such flows as closely as possible, and sometimes to trade more than once per
day. For an illustration of the degree of variation that would occur in the supply of
clearing balances in the case of New Zealand, if the RBNZ did not conduct daily “liq-
uidity management operations” to offset these flows, see Chart 5 in Brookes (1999).
48 Of course, a substantial departure of the overnight rate from the target rate will
suggest mis-estimation of the required supply of clearing balances (2.5), and this
information is not ignored. In some cases, banks that operate a channel system even
find a “second round” of open-market operations to be necessary, later in a given day,
in order to correct an initial mis-estimate of the desired ; and this is obviously in
response to observed pressure on overnight rates in the interbank market. But in
Australia and New Zealand, these are infrequent—in Australia, they were necessary
only four times in 1999, never in 2000, and twice so far (as of September) in 2001. In
Canada, small open-market operations are often conducted at a particular time (11:45
a.m.) to “reinforce the target rate” if the market is trading very far away from the tar-
get rate. However, this intervention does not amount to an elastic supply of funds at
the target rate, and its effect upon the end-of-day supply of clearing balances is always
canceled out later in the afternoon, so that the end-of-day supply equals the quantity
announced by 4:30 p.m. the previous day. Thus, the supply curve for end-of-day bal-
ances in Canada is completely vertical at    , as shown in Figure 1.
49 The deposit facility existed prior to June 1998, but the lending facility was intro-
duced only in preparation for the switch to a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) sys-
tem for interbank payments, and was little used prior to the introduction of that sys-
tem in late June (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1998).
50 This is the level aimed at in the bank’s initial daily open-market operations. As
noted above, there are a few days on which the bank traded again in a “second round.”
51 In New Zealand, the “settlement cash target” was increased by a factor of 10 in
this period, with no effect at all upon actual overnight rates (Hampton, 2000).
52 The regime change was more dramatic in New Zealand at this time, as the RBNZ
had not previously announced a target for overnight interest rates at all, instead for-
mulating its operating target in terms of a “monetary conditions index.” See Guthrie





and Wright (2000) for further discussion of New Zealand policy prior to the introduc-
tion of the OCR system.
53 Similar conventions appear to exist in Australia and Canada as well, but perhaps
owing to larger size of these markets, trading is not so thoroughly determined by the
norm as is true in New Zealand.
54 See Clinton (1997) and Bank of Canada (1999) for details of the system, and the
connection between the change in the clearing system and the introduction of stand-
ing facilities for implementing monetary policy.
55 It is possible for the overnight rate to slightly exceed the Bank Rate when banks are
short of the specific types of collateral accepted at the Bank of Canada’s lending facility.
56 Since March 2000, the standard deviation of i – i* has been only 1.5 basis points
for Australia, 1.1 basis points for Canada, and less than 0.4 basis points for New
Zealand, but 13.4 basis points for the United States.
57 Special procedures adopted in Australia to deal with the “Y2K” panic are
described in Reserve Bank of Australia (2000).
58 Canada has defined its short-run policy objectives in terms of an “operating
band” for the overnight interest rate since June 1994, but did not use standing facili-
ties to enforce the bounds of the band prior to the introduction of the LVTS clearing
system in February 1999. Before then, intra-day interventions were used to prevent
the overnight rate from moving outside the band (Sellon and Weiner, 1997). The adop-
tion of systems based on standing facilities in both Australia and New Zealand also
coincided with the introduction of a real-time gross settlement system for payments
(Reserve Bank of Australia, 1998; Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1999). In the case
of New Zealand, an explicit operating target for the overnight rate (the “official cash
rate”) was also introduced only at this time.
59 Chari and Kehoe (1999) review recent literature showing that under an optimal
Ramsey-taxation scheme the optimal level of this sort of tax is likely to be zero.
60 This may well have been a reason for the greater difficulty experienced in New
Zealand at achievement of the RBNZ’s short-run operating targets prior to the intro-
duction of the OCR system in 1999. See Guthrie and Wright (2000) for discussion of
New Zealand’s previous approach to the implementation of monetary policy.
61 This seems to be the position of Goodhart (2000).
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62 This presumes a world in which no payments are cleared using central-bank bal-
ances. Of course, there would be no harm in continuing to offer such a facility as long
as the central-bank clearing system were still used for at least some payments.
63 Grimes (1992) shows that variation of the interest rate paid on central-bank bal-
ances would be effective in an environment in which central-bank reserves are no
more useful for carrying out transactions than other liquid government securities, so
that open-market purchases or sales of such securities are completely ineffective.
64 Hall (1983, 1999) has also proposed this as a method of price-level control in the
complete absence of monetary frictions. Hall speaks of control of the interest yield on
a government “security,” without any need for a central bank at all. But because of the
special features that this instrument would need to possess, that are not possessed by
privately issued securities—it is a claim only to future delivery of more units of the
same instrument, and society’s unit of account is defined in terms of this instrument—
it seems best to think of it as still taking the same institutional form that it does today,
namely, balances in an account with the central bank. Hall also proposes a specific
kind of rule for adjusting the interest rate on bank reserves in order to ensure a con-
stant equilibrium price level; but this particular rule is not essential to the general idea.
One might equally well simply adjust the interest paid on reserves according to a
“Taylor rule” or a Wicksellian price-level feedback rule (Woodford, 2001, chap. 2).
65 It is true that required clearing balances are remunerated at a rate equal to the
average of the federal funds rate over the reserve maintenance period. But this remu-
neration applies only to the balances that banks agree in advance to hold; their addi-
tional balances above this level are not remunerated, and so at the margin that is rele-
vant to the decision each day about how to trade in the federal funds market, banks
expect zero interest to be paid on their overnight balances.
66 This does not mean that Wicksell’s (1936) notion of a “natural” rate of interest
determined by real factors is of no relevance to the consideration of the policy options
facing a central bank. It is, indeed, as argued in Woodford (2001, chap. 4). But the nat-
ural rate of interest is the rate of interest required for an equilibrium with stable prices;
the central bank, nonetheless, can arbitrarily choose the level of interest rates (within
limits) because it can choose the degree to which prices shall increase or decrease.
67 The basic point was famously made by Wicksell (1936, pp. 100-101), who com-
pares relative prices to a pendulum that returns always to the same equilibrium posi-
tion when perturbed, while the money prices of goods in general are compared to a
cylinder resting on a horizontal plane, that can remain equally well in any location on
the plane.
68 This does not mean, of course, that absolutely any paths for these variables can
be achieved through monetary policy; the chosen paths must be consistent with certain
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constraints implied by the conditions for a rational-expectations equilibrium. But this
is true even in the case of the central bank’s choice of a path for the price level. Even
in a world with fully flexible wages and prices, for example, it would not be possible to
bring about a rate of deflation so fast as to imply a negative nominal interest rate.
69 See Hall (1999) and White (2001) for expression of similar views. White empha-
sizes the role of legal-tender statutes in defining the meaning of a national currency
unit. But such statutes do not represent a restriction upon the means of payment that
can be used within a given geographical region—or at any rate, there need be no such
restrictions upon private agreements for the point to be valid. What matters is simply
what contracts written in terms of a particular unit of account are taken to mean, and
the role of law in stabilizing such meanings is essentially no different than, say, in the
case of trademarks.
70 Costa and De Grauwe (2001) instead argue that “in a cashless society ... the cen-
tral bank cannot ‘force the banks to swallow’ the reserves it creates” (p. 11), and speak
of the central bank being forced to “liquidate...assets” in order the redeem the central-
bank liabilities that commercial banks are “unwilling to hold” in their portfolios. This
neglects the fact that the definition of the U.S. dollar allows the Fed to honor a com-
mitment to pay a certain number of dollars to account-holders the next day by simply
crediting them with an account of that size at the Fed—there is no possibility of
demanding payment in terms of some other asset valued more highly by the market.
Similarly, Costa and De Grauwe argue that “the problem of the central bank in a cash-
less society is comparable to [that of a] central bank pegging a fixed exchange rate”
(footnote 15). But the problem of a bank seeking to maintain an exchange-rate peg is
that it promises to deliver a foreign currency in exchange for its liabilities, not liabil-
ities of its own that it freely creates. Costa and De Grauwe say that they imagine a
world in which “the unit of account remains a national affair...and is provided by the
state” (p. 1), but seem not to realize that this means defining that unit of account in
terms of central-bank liabilities.
71 I should emphasize that I am quite skeptical of the likelihood of such an outcome.
It seems more likely that there will continue to be substantial convenience to being
able to carry out all of one’s transactions in a single currency, and this is likely to mean
that an incumbent monopolist—the national central bank—will be displaced only if it
manages its currency spectacularly badly. But history reminds us that this is possible.
72 The connection between price stability and the minimization of economic dis-
tortions resulting from price or wage stickiness is treated in detail in Woodford (2001,
chap. 6).
73 The considerations determining the desirable extent of such blocs are essentially
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